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GENDER, GENES, AND CHOICE: A
COMPARATIVE LOOK AT FEMINISM,
EVOLUTION, AND ECONOMICS
KATHARINE K. BAKER
This Article compares the methodological similarities between
evolutionary biology and conventional law and economics. It
shows how these methodologies diverge, in critical and parallel
ways, from what has come to be known as feminist method. In
doing so, the Article suggests that feminists in the legal academy
should be suspicious of the parsimonious models upon which both
conventional evolutionary biologists and conventional law and
economics scholars rely. Biological and economic models employ
analogous concepts of maximization (including theories of
autonomy, choice, and measurement) and stable equilibria
(usually produced by stable preferences) to make predictions and
proscriptions for law. The simplicity of each discipline's
assumptions about maximization and stability make these models
particularly inapposite for feminism. The last section of the
Article explores how the models have failed feminists in one area
of particular import to women, the legal treatment of domestic
labor.
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Notwithstanding the efforts of some state education boards,1
evolution is big news these days.2 The findings of evolutionary
biology, also known as evolutionary psychology or sociobiology, are
repeatedly finding their way into both the popular press and
contemporary legal scholarship.3 Although there may be several
reasons for biology's popularity in law, its close affinity with law and
economics is surely one of them.4  Biology helps explain what
1. On August 11, 1999, the Kansas Board of Education voted to delete virtually any
mention of evolution from the state's science curriculum. Larry Witham, Evolution Takes
a Hit in Kansas Schools: "Creation" View to Get Classroom Respect, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1999, at Al. Although Kansas has the most thorough removal of evolution and its
underlying concepts, it is not the only state to have faced the debate in recent years. The
decision by Kansas to drop the teaching of evolution from its required curriculum was
followed by a similar move in Kentucky. Ed Golder, Scientist Rips Attacks on Teaching of
Evolution, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 12, 1999, at B4, available at 1999 WL 22971840.
Alabama, Illinois, and Nebraska have diluted evolution in their new standards. Witham,
supra.
2. See Erica Goode, Human Nature: Born or Made? Evolutionary Theorists
Provoke an Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,2000, at Fl.
3. A Nexus search of "sociobiology" and "evolutionary psychology" gave 377 hits
from June 1999 to June 2000. Articles and symposia integrating biology and law have
proliferated in the last several years. See Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in
Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L.
REv. 971, 984 (1995) (offering biological reasons for what has been seen as sex
discrimination); Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence
Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do With It?, 57 U. PIr. L. REv. 841, 871-75 (1996) (using
biology to evaluate the undue influence doctrine in probate); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture,
and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV 827, 853-
57 (1999) (describing biological reasons for rape). See generally Symposium, Law, Human
Behavior and Evolution, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (1997) (containing a variety of
articles on different ways in which evolutionary biology can be applied to law);
Symposium on Biology and Sexual Aggression: Parts I and II, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 113,
113-346 (1999) (compiling a variety of articles on biological reasons for rape and on how
the law might respond).
4. Richard Posner is a particularly strong advocate of evolutionary biology. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 472 (1995) ("It is no longer easy to distinguish
a sociologist from an anthropologist, or a classicist from either, or a literary theorist from a
philosopher, or even an economist from an evolutionary biologist.") (emphasis added);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 14 (1999)
("Economic theory is closely related to the theory of evolution; concepts of maximization,
competition, unconscious rationality, cost, investment, self-interest, survival, and
equilibrium play parallel roles in both theories. Evolution deals with unconscious
maximizers, the genes; economics with conscious maximizers, persons.") [hereinafter
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economics has always assumed, namely, preferences.. Thus, biological
analysis can explain, among other things, why we developed the
ability to love (because it helped bind us to spouses and children in a
way that ultimately enhanced our evolutionary success); 5 why we
developed a sense of fairness (so that we could reap the benefits of
cooperation without being taken advantage of by those who would
exploit our cooperation);6 and why men and women might differ in
their sexual habits (the different degrees of parental investment
necessary to reproduce successfully make it more likely that women
will value quality of partner, while men will value quantity).7
With these kinds of explanations in tow, economists can feel
better about their starting place, which has always been one where
preferences are given 8 Taken together, biology tells us why we want
what we want and economics tells us the most efficient way to get
what we want. Both assume that the actor, be it a gene that wants to
reproduce or a person with a utility function, maximizes its self-
interest by pursuing the best strategy to attain its ends. Competition
and interactions between these strategies often render stable
equilibria.
To date, many people have noted this affinity between
economics and evolutionary biology,9 but only a few have noted the
POSNER, PROBLEMATICS]; see also Mark F. Grady & Michael T. McGuire, A Theory of
the Origin of Natural Law, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 87, 88 (1997) ("Economic
Theory posits that institutions result from individual human decisions to maximize
individual welfare. Biological theory assumes that animal cooperation results from
individual behavior that maximizes fitness.").
5. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 54 (1988).
6. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 88-105
(1984) (explaining why it may be evolutionarily advantageous to cooperate); Robert
Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. OF BIOL. 35 (1971) (explaining
the reproductive benefits of unselfish behavior).
7. Bruce Ellis & Donald Symons, Sex Differences in Sexual Fantasy: An
Evolutionary Psychological Approach, 27 J. SEx RES. 527, 551 (1990) (reporting data
indicating that men tend to have sexual fantasies about a variety of women); Barbara
Smuts, The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy, 6 HUM. NATURE 1,11 (1995).
8. See Robert D. Cooter, Comment on Article by Professor Jones, 8 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 209, 210 (1997) ("In economics ... conventional theorists take 'tastes' as
given.").
9. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 88 (1992) ("[T]here are illuminating
analytical parallels between the biological and the economic approaches, and ... the two
approaches are mutually reinforcing and may in combination constitute a more powerful
theory than either by itself."); J. Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Viewpoint, 20
J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1977) ("There is ... a special link between economics and
sociobiology over and above the mere fact that economics studies a subset of the social
behavior of one of the higher mammals. The fundamental organizing concepts of the
dominant analytical structures employed in economics and in sociobiology are strikingly
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affinity between evolutionary biology and feminism. 0  Yet
evolutionary biology provides for feminists just what it provides for
economists: an explanation for why people behave the way they do.
Economics purports to show us how markets operate. Feminism
purports to tell us how patriarchy operates. Both explain how the
world works in light of given assumptions about, respectively,
preferences and male dominance. Biology tells us why both
preferences and male dominance exist. Moreover, biology provides
for feminism a description of the world that reinforces claims of male
dominance.
Why, then, do we not see the overlap between feminism and
biology that we see between economics and biology?" The answer, I
will suggest, is methodological. The affinity between economics and
evolutionary biology stems not only from the tongue-in-groove fit
between preferences and their rational expression, but also from core
parallel. What biologists study can be regarded as 'Nature's Economy.' "); Ulrich Witt,
Economics, Sociobiology, and Behavioral Psychology on Preferences, 12 J. OF ECON.
PSYCHOL. 557, 559 (1991) ("[T]here are significant similarities between economics and
biology and, sometimes, even modest forms of mutual inspiration in particular with regard
to the theory of natural selection .... Both sociobiology and economics are interested in
explaining observable behavior in terms of the obvious or, in case of genetic fitness, latent
competition induced by scarcity."); Amy L. Wax, Against Nature: On Robert Wright's The
Moral Animal, 63 U. CH. L. REV. 307, 307 (1996) (book review) ("If sociobiology is the
answer, what is the question? For one thing, economics.").
10. Among the exceptions are David Buss and Neil Malamuth, who have put together
a collection of writings highlighting the intersections between feminism and biology as it
pertains to rape. See SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996) [hereinafter SEX,
POWER, CONFLICT]. Patricia Gowaty organized a seminar of biologists to look at the
intersections between biology and feminism. The works are collected in FEMINISM AND
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: BOUNDARIES, INTERSECTIONS, AND FRONTIERS (Patricia
Gowaty ed., 1997) [hereinafter FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY]. In addition,
feminist evolutionary biologists have, for years, been arguing that it is possible and
important to do evolutionary biology from a feminist perspective. See SARAH BLAFFER
HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A HISTORY OF MOTHERS, INFANTS, AND NATURAL
SELECTION 22 (2000); SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE WOMAN THAT NEVER EVOLVED 1-
3 (1981) [hereinafter HRDY, NEVER EVOLVED]; Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against
Women: An Evolutionary Perspective, 3 HUM. NATURE 1 (1992). It is the legal academy
that has done little to address the intersection, despite extensive discussions of both
biology and feminism. One exception to this is Mary Anne Case's response to Richard
Epstein in Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369 (1995).
In a more recent attempt to force the intersection, Arizona State University
brought together several feminist legal scholars who had written on rape and many of the
most prominent biologists who study rape. It was quite a contentious weekend, the
written results of which can be found in 39 JURIMETRICS J. 113, supra note 3.
11. For a discussion of what might be gained by looking at the overlap, see generally
Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 CHi-KENT L. REv. 805 (2000).
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methodological tools that underlie each discipline. 12  The key
similarities are the use of maximization (which includes notions of
self-interest, choice, and measurement) and the presumption of
optimality from equilibria (which usually requires assumptions about
stable preferences). This Article will explore how the concepts of
maximization and optimal equilibria are, in and of themselves,
problematic for feminist jurisprudence.
Before starting, a note on essentialization is in order. In
explaining how a biologist or an economist would describe or analyze
an issue, I do not mean to suggest that all biologists or all economists
think in a uniform manner prescribed by their discipline. Obviously,
significant depth and variety exist within each field.13 What I am
analyzing is the prototypical biological and economic models that are
usually applied to law. The prototypical biological model commonly
applied to law is one in which human activity, particularly behavior as
it pertains to sex and relationships between the sexes, is explained by
genes maximizing their reproductive success. The prototypical
economic model commonly applied to law is the neoclassical one in
which people are rational maximizers whose preferences are
exogenous and stable, and whose choices, as revealed through action,
are reflective of those preferences.14 Some refer to this model of law
and economics as "the Chicago School,"" others as "conventional law
12. See Hirshleifer, supra note 9, at 1-2. Feminists, no doubt, resist biology because
they fear that arguments or descriptions rooted in biology necessarily imply that what is
biological is inevitable. This fear is unwarranted, see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying
text (explaining that biologists recognize that culture has a strong effect on biological
predisposition).
13. In biology, some scholars emphasize the interaction between genetic
predisposition and cultural conditioning to explain behaviors, see ROBERT BOYD &
PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 202 (1985), while
others root certain behaviors almost exclusively in biology, see generally RANDY
THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE (2000) (arguing that
rape is rooted in evolution). In economics, as Amartya Sen wrote several years ago, "[1]f
today you were to poll economists of different schools, you would almost certainly find the
coexistence of beliefs (i) that the rational behaviour theory is unfalsifiable, (ii) that it is
falsifiable and so far unfalsified, and (ii) [sic] that it is falsifiable and indeed patently
false." AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 91 (1982).
14. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 389, 394-96 (asserting that the core
assumptions of the neoclassical model involve rationally maximizing people, whose
preferences are exogenous and stable); Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998)
("Traditional law and economics is largely based on the standard assumptions of
neoclassical economics.").
15. For a discussion of the differences between the Chicago School of law and
economics and a "progressive approach," see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING
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and economics "16 or "the common understanding of normative
economic analysis. 17 Anyone familiar with the depth of work in
either biology or economics can recognize that these models are
particularly simplistic."i They have been challenged by many within
the respective disciplines. 9 My purpose is to broaden that challenge
and reveal how the prototypical models of both biology and
economics suffer from the same flaws.
This Article begins in Part I with a brief primer on evolutionary
biology. Part I explains what feminism has to gain from biology,
notwithstanding the fear of inevitability that many associate with
biological arguments: Biological models reinforce feminist claims
with regard to male dominance and sexual exploitation. Biology says
nothing about what should be, however, and most people familiar
with the biological paradigm readily concede that some sort of
normative civil structure is required to overcome the harshness of a
world governed by genetic predisposition." Part II analyzes what
economics has to gain from biology, notwithstanding the harshness of
the biological model: Biological models reinforce economic claims
with regard to the ubiquity of maximization and the relevance of
stability. Although economics and biology employ different
(arguably opposite) theories of autonomy and choice, both disciplines
rely on unitary metrics and cost-benefit analyses to determine the
maximization effects of any given action. Both disciplines also rely on
the stability of equilibria to make predictions about behavior. These
similar methodologies diverge from feminist method and analysis in
parallel and critical ways. The simplicity of the maximization models
and the presumptions about stable preferences (which produce stable
equilibria) are inconsistent with women's experiences and feminism's
normative commitments. Part III elaborates on the problems with
the law employing either the economic or the biological models of
THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE
14-27 (1992).
16. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1481-84 (referring repeatedly to
"conventional law and economics").
17. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 966,
968 (2001) ("Under a common understanding of normative economic analysis, legal rules
are assessed by reference to wealth maximization or efficiency .... ).
18. The tendency to rely on oversimplified models may well be an inevitable result of
trying to incorporate biology or economics into law. The more complex the model, the
better it is at capturing reality, but the less useful it is to law. As variables and outcomes
multiply, it is increasingly difficult to incorporate predictions from those models into legal
policy.
19. See infra notes 205-06,226-36 and accompanying text.
20. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
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human behavior in one area of particular import to women: the legal
treatment of domestic labor.
This Article does not call on feminism to reject everything that
biology and economics have to offer. Each discipline provides much
that can help explain why and how women are treated unfairly.
Feminism may well be able to use insights from each area to help
determine how best to formulate its normative commitments.21 This
Article does argue, however, that feminism must be suspicious of the
parsimonious models on which both biology and economics tend to
rely. A world in which maximization is the only way of thinking
about behavior and stable equilibria is the only way of thinking about
optimality is a world of limited potential for both men and women.
Unless we want to accept these limitations, the law must be wary of
the models that reinforce them.
I. BIOLOGY AND FEMINISM
This part presents evolutionary biology's basic, albeit
essentialized, explanation for why human sexuality looks the way it
does. For an evolutionary biologist, just about everything boils down
to the size of our sex cells, or gametes, all of which have only one
purpose, to reproduce. Together, male and female gametes
reproduce their own genetic material by creating new life. Female
gametes, unlike the bodies that house them, are much bigger than
their male counterparts. The larger size of the female gamete allows
it to do much more than just contribute genetic material. It allows the
female gamete to provide the food reserves that an embryo needs to
grow. By providing those food reserves, the female is limited in the
number of gametes she can provide because each female gamete
demands more resources and requires more time to develop than
does a male gamete. This means any one male can produce many
more gametes and beget many more offspring than can any one
female. As Richard Dawkins comments, "[I]t is possible to interpret
all the other differences between the sexes as stemming from this one
basic difference.""n
21. For instance, I have recently argued that biology's premises can lead us to
question the law's constructions of rape, marriage, and parenthood. If what biologists say
is right, the law's treatment of these areas is bound to have very deleterious effects on
women. Recognizing these effects can force us to focus on what we actually want the law
to say and accomplish. "By laying bare the harsh reality of nature, [biology] forces
[feminists] to embrace [their] normative convictions." Baker, supra note 11, at 806.
22. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 152.
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The disparity in gamete size is just the beginning of vastly
different male and female investment in offspring. Because human
beings reproduce by fertilizing internally and giving birth to live
offspring after a lengthy gestation period, the parent who carries and
nurtures the embryo must invest uniquely and substantially in that
embryo after it is fertilized, but before it is born.P This parent is the
female. Moreover, because for most of our evolutionary history
offspring were dependent on maternal lactation, females had to invest
more than males once the child was born. 4 A female cannot do
anything about this investment imbalance. If she is to reproduce, she
must invest in her offspring, and the only way for a gene that is inside
a female body to reproduce is to compel that body to undergo the
trials and tribulations of pregnancy. Her genes compel her to do so
because they are singularly selfish. All they want to do is replicate, as
much and as well as they can.'
Men's genes compel them to reproduce also, of course, but this
requires relatively little effort. Males are much less likely to invest
heavily in embryos once fertilized. This is true for several reasons.
First, males can do only a limited amount while the embryo is
growing inside the female, though he can protect a pregnant female as
a way of protecting his offspring. Second, a male is never 100 percent
sure that a child is in fact his own.26 Females have no doubt. Thus, a
male's incentive to care for a child must be discounted by the chances
that the child is not comprised of his genes.2 7 Third, even if he is
23. The term "parental investment" was first coined by Robert Trivers. See Robert L.
Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELEcTION AND THE
DESCENT OF MAN 136, 139 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972). Trivers defined "parental
investment" as "any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that increases the
offspring's chance of surviving (and hence [the offspring's] reproductive success) at the
cost of the parent's ability to invest in other offspring." Id.
24. Human offspring remain dependent on adult care long after the parent has
stopped lactating. This means that, in general, parental investment is higher in humans
than in almost all other mammals. However, no biological requirement dictates that the
parental investment necessary after lactation be from the female.
25. "We can... assume that each individual body is a selfish machine, trying to do the
best for all its genes." DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 145-46.
26. David M. Buss, Sexual Conflict: Evolutionary Insights into Feminism and the
"Battle of the Sexes," in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT, supra note 10, at 296, 302 ("Because
fertilization occurs internally within women, men are always less tha[n] 100% 'certain'...
that their putative children are genetically their own. Some cultures have phrases to
describe this, such as 'mama's baby, papa's maybe.' "). Reproductive technologies and
DNA testing greatly improve our ability to know paternity for certain, but these
technologies are only available to a very small number of men.
27. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 66 (1994) ("Whereas the woman's
natural fear is the withdrawal of his investment, his natural fear is that the investment is
misplaced.").
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almost certain the child is his, he may well be able to rely on the
mother to provide the necessary care. This is what Robert Trivers
labels the "cruel bind."' As long as one parent can be assured that
the other parent will care for the offspring, the first parent, who cares
only about reproducing, can take the opportunity to go make other
offspring. Why overinvest in one, when you could make two?
Because the male cannot do the initial work of reproduction, the
female parent has less opportunity to abandon child-rearing work; she
knows that the male will not (indeed, for a while cannot) do the work
if she walks away. She will be dooming her own genetic material if
she leaves him to do a job he cannot do. The opportunistic male, on
the other hand, often capitalizes on his ability to leave and thereby
increase his chances of fertilizing another egg from another female.
The likelihood that a female will be abandoned tends to make
her very, very careful in her mate choice. 9 She wants to mate with
someone who will not leave her, despite his incentives to do so. She
wants someone who is going to help her during the periods when she
will be less able to help herself (such as pregnancy and maybe
lactation) and who will help the offspring after it is born, but still
dependent. Thus, she will try to mate only with a male who is able
and willing to provide resources.
Females ascertain which males are best able to provide resources
by determining the male's status within the male community.3 He
who has the most prestige vis-a-vis his male cohorts is most likely to
be able to provide for her and most likely to fend off attacks from
other males. Males meanwhile vie for the most desirous female
mates31 by competing with each other to gain status. Through
displays of relative wealth and solicitude, males try to convince
28. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 160 ("As Trivers puts it, the partner who is left
behind is placed in a cruel bind.").
29. See JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 454-
55 (2d ed. 1979) (explaining that in a society where males provide maternal resources for
their children, females select partners who will make a large parental investment in their
progeny); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
NATURE 218-19 (1993) (noting that females value males who do not divide child-rearing
efforts among multiple families); ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 215-19 (1985)
(discussing examples that support the theory that sex differences are caused by relative
parental investment).
30. See generally David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences:
Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1989)
(concluding that females prefer to mate with males who are financially secure and
ambitious).
31. "Desirous" should be defined as likely to be able to reproduce successfully.
Young healthy females, or at least females that appear to be young and healthy, are likely
to be the most popular. See WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 65.
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females that they are willing to provide the resources that the female
and the offspring will need. Females, in turn, wary of being duped by
potentially phony displays of resources or solicitude, will often make
males demonstrate considerable commitment before voluntarily
copulating. This is why, in many species, females appear coy.32 They
play "hard to get" in order to ensure that the male has the
perseverance and desire to remain with them. In birds this manifests
,itself in the tradition of males building nests for the females whom
they court.3 Female birds have also developed a strategy of feigning
helplessness, so that they can discern which males respond positively
to conditions of dependence (and hence are likely to be good
fathers).34
The good news for human females is that because human
offspring were particularly likely to need male investment, it became
evolutionarily advantageous for men to want to stick around.
Offspring whose fathers provided resources and care stood a better
chance of surviving to reproductive age. Thus, evolution favored men
who grew attached to their children. The need for more male
parental investment explains why human males are much more likely
to know and care for their children than are chimps or bonobos to
whom humans are closely related. It also explains the phenomenon
that we know as paternal love. Love has a purpose. It binds fathers
32. "Feminine coyness is in fact very common among animals, and so are prolonged
courtship or engagement periods." DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 161. Feminist biologist
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy argues that females are not nearly as coy as traditional biology has
presumed them to be and that modem evolutionary biologists assume female coyness far
too readily. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Empathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female, in
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 119, 119-20 (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986) [hereinafter
Hrdy, Empathy]. She also suggests that Darwin and his latter-day progeny let
contemporary cultural understandings influence their interpretation of the behavior they
see in animals. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Raising Darwin's Consciousness, 8 HUM. NATURE 1, 8
(1997) [hereinafter Hrdy, Darwin's Consciousness].
33. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 165-66. Birds are an important example for humans
because bird offspring, like human offspring, appear to require significant male
investment. See infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
34. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 166 ("In birds this has usually been regarded as a kind
of regression to juvenile behaviour on the part of the female. She begs from the male,
using the same gestures as a young bird would use.").
35. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 57. This does not mean, however, that men do not also
have an incentive to leave. Evolution favors some tendency for males to invest in
children, but they still have less incentive to do so than females, who sacrifice more for and
incur greater opportunity costs with each child. See infra note 44.
36. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 57 ("Fathers everywhere feel love for their children,
and that's a lot more than you can say for chimp fathers and bonobo fathers, who don't
seem to have much of a clue as to which youngsters are theirs. This love leads fathers to
help feed and defend their children, and teach them useful things.").
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to children even though from the father's genes' perspective using his
resources to produce another offspring might seem more
advantageous. Love also binds mates to each other because staying
together often is the best way for both male and female genes to
ensure reproductive success.37 Robert Frank suggests that emotions
act like commitment devices "when it is in a person's interest to make
a binding commitment to behavior that will later seem contrary to
self-interest. ' 3 Emotions like marital love evolved because it can be
evolutionarily advantageous for a male to feel a spousal commitment
that transcends reproductive attraction. The emergence and survival
of love suggests that a male may actually experience more
reproductive success if he sticks by his spouse than if he continually
explores potentially more fertile opportunities.
The relatively high degree of male parental investment also
explains another universal human phenomenon: male sexual
jealousy.39 If a man invests in his mate's offspring, he wants assurance
that her offspring are also his offspring.4" One way to ensure that he
is not supporting someone else's genes is to maintain rigid control
over his mate's sexual behavior. As biologist David Buss reports,
"[I]n a cross-cultural perspective, the ways in which men attempt to
control women's sexuality is staggering."' This control, which often
co-exists with self-expressed feelings of love on the male's part,
42
includes, in humans, everything from female veiling to mutilation of
female genitalia.43
To sum up so far, men have an incentive to engage in frequent
sex with as many women as they can find who will bear and care for
the offspring produced. Women want supportive men who will help
them care for the relatively fewer offspring to whom they have given
their own genetic material. Under a biological view, each sex will do
what it can to maximize its desired outcome. Sometimes the best way
37. I& at 59.
38. FRANK, supra note 5, at 47.
39. Buss, supra note 26, at 305.
40. If a man invests in another man's offspring, he is helping to perpetuate that other
man's, not his own, genes. "Not long for this world are the genes of a man who spends his
time rearing children who aren't his." WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 66.
41. Buss, supra note 26, at 298.
42. For the male, "love and need are [often] bound up with fear and envy." ALLAN
G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 41
(1997).
43. Buss, supra note 26, at 298. Among primates, the attempts include: in baboons,
attacking females that seem interested in other baboons; in gorillas, kidnapping females
and removing them from the troupe; and, among a variety of different primates,
infanticide. See Smuts, supra note 7, at 6.
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to maximize reproduction is to enter into an agreement whereby the
female agrees to reproduce the male's genes and the male agrees to
help. Love makes honoring this agreement easier. Even with love,
however, paternal uncertainty and the many potentially fertile
options elsewhere create "evolutionary pressure on males to invest a
little bit less in each child and to have more children by different
wives."'
Moreover, the love strategy is not always the most reproductively
beneficial. It is just one strategy among many. Game theory helps
explain why this is so.4 5 If one assumes that players (that is, males and
females) try to maximize their outcomes (that is, their reproductive
success) by adopting certain strategies or patterns of behavior, and if
one assumes that the success of any given player's strategy will
depend on the strategy chosen by the other player, one can model the
mating dilemma described above. Richard Dawkins did precisely
that.
Dawkins hypothesized two female strategies, coy and fast, and
two male strategies, faithful and philanderer.4 6 Coy females will not
mate until a male has proven himself able and willing to provide. As
suggested above, ascertaining these qualities requires time and
energy-i.e., resources. A fast female will mate immediately with any
male, thus avoiding any expenditure of resources on courtship. She
will mate with either a faithful male or a philanderer male. A faithful
male will court, stay mostly faithful to, and provide for his mate and
her children. He will spend considerable resources and forego other
potentially reproductive experiences in doing so. A philanderer male
will try to maximize his reproductive success by refusing to waste time
either courting potential mates or caring for offspring. He will mate
with as many women as will mate with him.
As is the norm with game theory, Dawkins then applied arbitrary
hypothetical values to the outcomes.4 7 A successful child counted
+15; the cost of rearing a child was -20; and the cost of courtship was
-3. With these numbers, in an ideal monogamous society in which all
the females are coy and all the males are faithful, each male and
44. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 158; see also TRIVERS, supra note 29, at 260-62
(observing that male and female reproductive strategies differ given paternal uncertainty
and the relative costlessness with which men can produce offspring).
45. John Maynard Smith pioneered the application of game theory to evolutionary
science. See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EvOLUnON AND THE THEORY OF
GAMES (1982).
46. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 162-64.
47. Id. at 163.
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female will successfully reproduce. With each child, they will each
gain 15 and each lose 13 (the cost of courtship (-3) plus half the cost
of rearing the child (-10)), for a net value of +2.41 But suppose a fast
female wanders into that society. She will spend less time courting
and therefore have more time to reproduce. Because the males are
faithful, she can rely on them to support her children. Indeed, as long
as she finds just one man who is faithful, she can rely on him to
support all the children that might be the products of her midnight
dalliances.49 Each child will benefit her +5 instead of +2 (+15 less half
of the shared cost of rearing, but nothing lost to courtship). Her
higher score indicates that her genes will do very well over time. She
will produce more than the coy female because she will have wasted
less time courting and she will likely be able to "dupe" her co-parent
into providing for more of her genetic material than he otherwise
would.5" Fast female behavior will thrive because it will produce
more offspring.
Introduce a philanderer male into the fast female environment,
though, and the situation changes drastically. Once fast female genes
become prevalent, philanderer males stand a much better chance of
succeeding. They can easily find mates who do not require them to
engage in the pedantics of courtship. Philanderer males and fast
females produce many offspring very quickly. The problem for the
fast female is that she is left alone to do all of the child bearing and
48. Dawkins assumes that males and females split the cost of child-rearing (-20)
equally. Id. Many feminists and much empirical research refutes the idea that men and
women actually invest equally in child-rearing. Mary E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 167 (1992)
("[R]egardless of whether we should make equal parenting our primary goal, it is not
occurring. Women continue to be the primary caretakers physically and emotionally even
in dual-wage families. Women continue to invest more emotionally in children than men.
We continue to socialize our daughters to do so."). Numerous studies documenting how
partners allocate domestic chores indicate that women do vastly more caretaking and
other domestic work than do men. For a summary of these studies, see ARLIE
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 271-78 (1989). Hochschild concludes that women who work outside the home
work approximately one full month a year more than their wage-earning spouse. Id. at 3.
Men do tend to invest more financially in their children than women do, but as explained
infra, text accompanying notes 258-59, in doing so, men do not incur nearly the same
opportunity costs as women do. Thus, Dawkins' assumption that men and women share
the -20 cost of child rearing equally may be mistaken.
49. If, after reproducing with her primary mate, Mr. Nice Guy, Ms. Fast finds some
other mate, Mr. Phil, Fast and Phil can mate without bearing any of the costs of courtship
and both can rely on Mr. Nice Guy to provide for any offspring.
50. This may be important to her if males other than her primary partner have
desirable qualities (strength or intelligence perhaps) that her primary partner lacks but
that she wants her offspring to absorb.
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rearing. While the fast female thrived in an environment with faithful
men (her payoff per child was +5), she suffers badly in an
environment with philanderers (her payoff per child is -5, the sum of
+15 and -20). Without any help, the task of child rearing is too
onerous. At this point, the coy female, who by learning how to detect
male faithfulness ensures a gain of +2, regains the evolutionary
advantage.
After a while, the emergence and decline of these varying
strategies converge into a stable state. This is what biologists refer to
as an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS. An ESS is a "strategy
which, if most members of a population adopt it, cannot be bettered
by an alternative strategy. ''51 Some strategy or set of strategies exists
that will produce an equilibrium.52 In the male/female game
described above, equilibrium will be reached if most of the men are
faithful and most of the women are coy. A few fast women will be
able to survive, but once they become tob plentiful, philanderers Will
prosper and that will, in turn, give the advantage to female coyness.
With Dawkins's numbers, the equilibrium works out at 5/6 coy
females and 5/8 faithful males. If more than 1/6 of the females adopt
fast strategies, it becomes advantageous for males to increase the
portion of philanderers to above 5/8. Coyness then becomes more
attractive again, and an equilibrium emerges.
The equilibrium analysis can explain various reproductive
strategies, but several important caveats merit mention. First, the
fractions themselves are arbitrary because they are based on
Dawkins's original arbitrary numbers.5 3 Second, the game theory
scenario does not require that there actually be two different kinds of
males and females, only that there be two different kinds of male and
female behavior. Thus, the same equilibrium would work itself out if
individual females were coy 5/6 of the time, but fast 1/6 of the time, or
if half the women were coy 11/12 of the time but the other half only
9/12 of the time. Third, though Dawkins's game did work out to an
51. DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 74.
52. See id. Stable states like this one are known as Nash equilibria in game theory.
See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 33 (1989).
53. As suggested supra note 48, Dawkins's allocation of relative costs between the
sexes does not correspond with more recent empirical data on the division of child-rearing
labor.
[Vol. 80
2002] FEMINISM, EVOLUTION, AND ECONOMICS
equilibrium, not all evolutionary behaviors do. Sometimes no ESS
exists, and the best strategy to choose is one of randomness. 4
Fourth, and possibly most important, the mating strategies
described above are not the only means of procreation. Males and
females often develop other strategies and counterstrategies. For
instance, it is not uncommon for males to simply force females to
copulate. Sexual coercion, some forms of which are called rape in
human law, is common among primates and can be a successful
reproductive strategy for males 5 Male orangutans routinely force
females to have sex, often after violent resistance on the female's
part.56 Captive male chimpanzees and lowland gorillas "use[]
aggression to force females to copulate throughout the estrous
cycle. 5 7 Male Hamadryas baboons are famous for retaliating with
neck bites against a female mate when they notice her eye wandering
off in the direction of another male.58 Jane Goodall has noticed male
chimpanzees using comparable kinds of intimidation 5 9 and suggests
that, unless crippled or very old, an adult male can almost always
coerce an unwilling female to copulate.6
Females respond to these coercive behaviors with their own
strategies. Sometimes they fight back, though this is not usually
successful.61 Sometimes they try to mate early with a high-status male
and thereby secure his protection.6 After a coercive copulation,
females also can try to mate quickly with a male who will provide
resources and hope that he does not realize that he is providing for
54. See Linda Mealey, The Multiplicity of Rape: From Life History Strategies to
Prevention Strategies, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 217, 219 (1999) (explaining how randomness can
be the best strategy if one player can take advantage of another player's predictability).
55. See Jones, supra note 3, at 855 (observing that forced copulations may be the best
reproductive strategy for some males).
56. Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts, Male Aggression and Sexual Coercion of
Females in Nonhuman Primate and Other Mammals: Evidence and Theoretical
Implications, 22 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF BEHAV. 1, 6 (1993).
57. Id.
58. See HANS KUMMER, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF HAMADRYAS BABOONS 36-37
(1968); Smuts, supra note 7, at 7.
59. JANE GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR
443-53 (1986).
60. Id. at 481.
61. The Smuts explain that "female resistance is usually futile, and resistant females
risk severe injury." Smuts & Smuts, supra note 56, at 11.
62. Sarah L. Mesnick, Sexual Alliances: Evidence and Evolutionary Implications, in
FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 10, at 207, 217-20; see also Smuts
& Smuts, supra note 56, at 13-15.
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other than his own offspring.63 Some females also bond with other
females, in the hope that a single male will not be able to coerce them
if they can help each other.64 Barbara Smuts concludes that two
factors play a particularly important role in determining whether
female strategies will work: proximity to kin and female community.
Female dispersement away from their birthplace65 and solitary female
travel' reduce the potential number of allies females will have to
protect them from male aggression. As a result, patrilocal societies
and solitary female lifestyles increase female vulnerability.
At least one of these factors, patrilocality, is a common
characteristic of human society67 and thus may explain part of the
reason that human females are left so vulnerable to human male
aggression. Smuts goes on to suggest, though, that other factors
unique to human evolutionary history have rendered human females
particularly vulnerable. For instance, in order to improve our ability
to compete against other groups of humans, it was evolutionarily
advantageous for males to learn how to bond with each other.61 In
other primates, male-male alliances usually break down in
competition over females, but by learning how to control this
competition, male humans were better able to fight off offensive
attacks.69 This bonding also made it easier for human males to
collectively control women.0
63. "Best of all for her would be to try to deceive another male into adopting her
child, 'thinking' it is his own. This might not be too difficult if it is still a fetus, not yet
born." DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 158. If he does realize that the offspring is not his
own, he is likely to kill it. Infanticide is very common in most animal populations. See,
e.g., Jane Boggess, Infant Killing and Male Reproductive Strategies in Langurs, in
INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 283, 286 (Glenn
Hausfater & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984) (discussing infanticide as a basic reproductive
strategy) [hereinafter INFANTICIDE].
64. See Smuts, supra note 7, at 11; see also Amy R. Parish, Female Relationships in
Bonobos: Evidence for Bonding, Cooperation, and Female Dominance in a Male-
Philopatric Species, 7 HUM. NATURE 61-66 (1996).
65. For instance, female hamadryas baboons, unlike most other monkeys, disperse
from their female kin and are much more likely to be attacked by males than are other
female monkeys. Smuts, supra note 7, at 12.
66. Id Female orangutans travel alone with their infants most of the time and are
often attacked by males. Female bonobos, who spend most of their time with other non-
kin females, are rarely victims of male sexual aggression. Id. at 11-12.
67. Lars Rodseth et al., The Human Community as a Primate Society, 32 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 221, 229 (1991); Smuts, supra note 7, at 12-13 (citing C.R. Ember,
Myths about Hunter-Gatherers, 17 ETHNOLOGY 439,439-48 (1978)).
68. Smuts, supra note 7, at 14.
69. Id.
70. See generally LIONEL TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS (1970) (describing a universal
tendency of men to bond by excluding women).
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Humans are also uniquely interdependent. Individual women
and their children cannot survive on their own; they must rely on
others for what they need.7 All female primates want resource help
from males, but human females absolutely depend on some form of
assistance. This means that if males can control resources, they can
then control females. Smuts argues that:
[M]ale-male alliances and male control over resources
interacted in a positive feedback loop over the course of
human evolution. The prior existence of male cooperation
... facilitated male cooperation in hunting and in controlling
the results of the hunt. The possibility of controlling
resources, in turn, probably increased the benefits to males
of forming alliances with other males ....2
This abbreviated biological account of human development,
which starts with a recognition of the differences in gamete size and
then proceeds to explain disparate investment in child rearing,
courtship rituals, male jealousy, male violence against women, male
bonding, and female vulnerability, is not a particularly pleasant story,
but its themes are all too familiar to feminists. As Catharine
MacKinnon has been saying for two decades, "[W]omen's sexuality
largely defines women in this society." 73 Biology confirms that men's
desire and ability to control sexuality explains many of the norms,
institutions, and laws that define human culture. As Andrea Dworkin
has suggested and as biologists document, local customs reveal an
extraordinary and horrific variety of ways to restrict women's sexual
71. Smuts, supra note 7, at 15-17; HRDY, NEVER EVOLVED, supra note 10, at 8-9
("Among humans there is a universal reliance on shared or bartered food. In many
societies, a woman without a man to hunt or earn income, or a man without a wife to do
the cooking, is at considerable disadvantage. By contrast, among all nonhuman primates
each adult is entirely responsible for supplying his or her own food."). Martha Fineman
documents this interdependence for modern times. "The very process of assuming
caretaking responsibilities creates dependency in the caretaker-she needs some social
structure to provide the means to care for others." MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 163
(1995).
72. Smuts, supra note 7, at 15-16. Smuts also suggests that the human development of
language enabled the development of ideologies that greatly facilitated men's efforts to
control female sexuality. As Smuts puts it, the male use of language and ideology is an
"extension and elaboration" on prelinguistic forms of male control. Smuts, supra note 7,
at 19; see also irdy, Danvin's Consciousness, supra note 32, at 5 ("I am convinced that
male control over productive resources needed by women to reproduce lies at the heart of
the transformation from male-dominated[,] male-philopatric primate societies to full-
fledged patriarchy.").
73. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 174
(1979) (asserting that women, but not men, are seen primarily as sexual objects; therefore,
sexuality in the workplace has a discriminatory impact on women).
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agency.74 As Mary Becker has explained, patriarchy glosses over the
extent to which men's and women's interests conflict Biologists
assume this conflict76 and base virtually all of their predictions on it.
As feminist Allan Johnson recently noted, status contests among men
play a primary role in patriarchal systems.77  Biologists
wholeheartedly concur, suggesting that women choose high-status
men not only because they can provide resources,78 but also because,
as Cynthia Bowman has written, a woman who aligns herself with a
male helps ensure against sexual aggression from other males.79 As
Susan Brownmiller suggested to much male resistance, males also use
sexual aggression-i.e., rape-as a way of subordinating females.80
Some biologists pillory Brownmiller for suggesting that rape is more a
crime of violence than a crime of sex, a but the fact that any given
74. Compare ANDREA DwoRKIN, WOMAN HATING 95-150 (1974) (citing Chinese
footbinding and European witch hunts as examples of local customs that are designed to
restrict women's sexual agency), with Buss, supra note 26, at 298 ("In a cross-cultural
perspective, the ways in which men attempt to control women's sexuality is nothing short
of bewildering.").
75. Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 29 ("In a patriarchal culture, there is a strong tendency to deny
conflicts of interest between women and men despite obvious inequalities....")
[hereinafter Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality]; Mary Becker, Politics, Differences and
Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169, 183-85 ("Both women and men tend to
suppress the struggle between the sexes for a number of reasons. Men have an obvious
incentive to suppress conflict to preserve the status quo .... [Wiomen suppress conflict
[if] they have decided to achieve security through economic dependence on a man.").
76. Robert Trivers writes, "[O]ne can, in effect, treat the sexes as if they were
different species, the opposite sex being a resource relevant to producing maximum
surviving offspring." Trivers, supra note 23, at 153.
77. See JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 31 ("[T]he cycle of control and fear that drives
patriarchy has more to do with relations among men than with women, for it's men who
control men's standing as men.").
78. See Buss, supra note 26, at 307-08 (asserting that, universally, females are
attracted to men who have more resources relative to other men).
79. Walking with a man is a way of protecting oneself from the assaults of other men.
See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women,
106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 540 (1993) ("[S]treet harassment both increases women's
dependence on men and contributes to distrust and hostility between the sexes. For
example, street harassment, and the related danger of sexual assault, encourage women to
seek male escorts in public-men to protect them from harassment by other men ....").
For the biological counterpart, see Mesnick, supra note 62, at 207-08 (describing female
alliances with "protective males").
80. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15
(1975) ("[Rape] is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which
all men keep all women in a state of fear."); Susan Brownmiller & Barbara Mehrhof, A
Feminist Response to Rape as an Adaptation in Men, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 381, 382
(1992) ("The central insight of the feminist theory of rape identifies the act as a crime of
violence committed against women as a demonstration of male domination and power.").
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rape may be reproductively beneficial does not preclude it from also
being used as a tool for subordination. Biological accounts of
violence among primates demonstrate that males use a variety of
strategies to keep females in positions from which they can not reject
men's sexual access.
s2
Moreover, the entire system of gender, a field that is now
commanding its own academic departments, can be explained by the
biological desire to discern favorable reproductive characteristics.
Masculinity centers on competition, status, resources, and virilitys3 so
that females can discern who could best protect and provide for them.
Femininity is defined around notions of coyness, physical beauty (as a
sign of health), youth (as a sign of fertility), and weakness (as a way of
ensuring deference to a possessive spouse) so that males can discern
with whom they want to mate.' The Dawkins game theory analysis
also explains the existence of the Madonna/whore dichotomy, 5 which
feminists have spent years trying to explain and eradicate. 6 There is
some evolutionarily stable state in which a certain portion of females
are coy Madonnas and a certain portion are fast whores. The fast
female can start the process of disrupting this equilibrium, and thus it
makes sense that original sin was laid at women's feet.,'
81. Craig T. Palmer et al., Is it Sex Yet? Theoretical and Practical Implications of the
Debate over Rapists' Motives, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 271, 273, 279-82 (1999) (criticizing
Brownmiller and others by quoting John Hartung, Getting Real About Rape, 15 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 390, 392 (1992) ("[I]f those who think that rape is not a sexual act.., were
only a danger to themselves, we could let them play. But this is not the case, and rape is
not a game.")).
82. Hrdy, Darwin's Consciousness, supra note 32, at 24 (noting that males ensure
female compliance by regularly treating them violently); Smuts & Smuts, supra note 56, at
7 ("[M]ale aggression that has no obvious sexual significance may nevertheless function to
increase female sexual cooperation in the future....").
83. See JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 61 ("[Mien are aggressive, daring, rational,
emotionally inexpressive, strong, cool-headed, in control of themselves, independent,
active, objective, dominant, decisive, self-confident, and unnurturing.").
84. See SANDRA LiPsrrz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER 103 (1993) (describing early
gender tests in which femininity points were given for deferring to others, caring about
appearance, and being easily frightened).
85. See DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 85-105.
86. See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO WOMAN:
CHRISTIANITY'S CREATION OF THE SEX WAR IN THE WEST 52-87 (1986) (explaining the
importance to Christian thought of the juxtaposition of the Virgin Mary and Eve).
87. Ecclesiasticus 25:24, in THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE WITH THE APROCRYPHA (1970)
("Woman is the origin of sin, and it is through her that we all die."); Genesis 3:12, 3:16
(King James) ("And the man said, The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave
me of the tree, and I did eat.... Unto the women he said, I will greatly multiply thy
sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall
be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.").
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If feminists and biologists present such comparable descriptions
of the world, then why do so many legal feminists shudder when they
hear biological descriptions of the world? Some, no doubt, shudder
because of their tendency to assume that when biologists describe
genetic behavior the description of what is or what was necessarily
becomes a prediction of what will be. This assumption is wrong and
unfair to many biologists. Biologists recognize that environmental
factors play a huge role in affecting behavior.8 8 Many believe that
natural selection favored those who were able to adapt to different
social environments because of the "extremely diverse and variable
conditions in which humans live."89  Even if a behavior may be
evolutionarily beneficial in some contexts, it will not thrive in all
contexts, and adapting to different social customs may be
evolutionarily advantageous. Evolutionary biology and genetic
determinism are not one and the same.90
Nonetheless, the work of evolutionary biologists-even feminist
evolutionary biologists-differs in several key respects from that done
by most feminists in the legal academy. The reason feminist
jurisprudence is and should be wary of evolutionary biology has to do
not so much with the world that biologists describe as the methods
biologists use to draw their conclusions. The next section will focus
on two critical components of both economic and evolutionary
methodology: the presumption of maximization and the significance
of equilibria, and explain why they are problematic for legal
feminism.
88. See DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 3 ("[I]t is a fallacy-incidentally a very common
one-to suppose that genetically inherited traits are by definition fixed and unmodifiable.
Our genes may instruct us to be selfish, but we are not necessarily compelled to obey them
all our lives. ... [H]uman society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless
selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live."); Timothy H. Goldsmith &
Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief Overview and Some
Important Concepts, 39 JuRIMETRICS J. 131, 135 (1999) ("[A]ttempting to apportion the
causes of behavior, or indeed any feature of an organism, between nature and nurture,
between genes and environment, is a meaningless endeavor. Genes and environment are
inexorably linked. Understanding one, without understanding its relationship to the other,
obscures a rich and sophisticated understanding of behavior.").
89. Smuts, supra note 7, at 4.
90. Id. at 5 ("[M]any people incorrectly assume that to attribute an evolutionary
explanation to a behavior is equivalent to concluding that the behavior is fixed and cannot
be changed.... [E]volutionary analysis does not imply behavioral immutability.").
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II. ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGY
A. Maximization
Both economics and biology rely on the idea that actors, be they
individuals or genes, maximize their self-interest. For an economist,
this maximization process is about people choosing courses that will
best accommodate their needs and desires. For a biologist, this
maximization process is about genes leading people to demonstrate
certain behaviors. Those behaviors will come to dominate if they end
up reproducing more offspring than other kinds of behaviors.
Economists explain their maximization process as one in which
individuals choose to maximize their own utility. Biologists explain
their maximization process as one in which genes produce certain
reproductively successful behaviors. Both systems are considered
rational in that the actor adopts the best means of achieving its ends.91
Both systems also rely on unitary metrics to determine whether those
ends have been achieved. This subpart explores the similarities and
differences in each of these maximization processes and explains why
their simplicity, and almost perfect reciprocity, limits them in
comparable ways.
1. Selves, Preferences, and Choice
In The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Gary Becker
famously explains that "all human behavior can be viewed as
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of
preferences." 9  Several assumptions lie within that half-sentence,
most of which have already been well-critiqued in legal scholarship.
For instance, to suggest that individuals maximize their own utility
from a set of given preferences is to suggest that there is (1) an
autonomous self with (2) a discernable utility function who (3)
chooses among options. The idea that all human beings are
independent selves who make choices based on their own utility
functions or preferences has been questioned by many, particularly
feminists. First, the notion of self appears to be highly gendered. As
Carrie Menkel-Meadow summarizes, "The common theme that
unites [the] body of work by [feminist] psychologists.., is that
91. Richard Posner defines "rational" as "choosing the best means to the chooser's
ends." Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1551 (1998).
92. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOmiC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14
(1976).
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women experience themselves through connections and relationship
to others while men see themselves as separately identified
individuals."9 3 In other words, many women feel less boundaried and
self-defining than many men, and thus are less likely to feel like
autonomous selves. Second, much scholarly work suggests that
preferences are not given or exogenous in each individual, but are
instead a function of cultural norms,94 an individual's relative cultural
standing,9 and cultural expectations about, among other things,
fairness.96 Thus, the self and the culture in which that self lives cannot
be easily distinguished. The same culture that provides the options
helps define the self. Hence, third, individual choice is much more a
function of culture than Becker's maxim seems to suggest. This is
particularly problematic because, as Joan Williams has suggested in
the area of childcare97 and Vicki Schultz has suggested in the realm of
work,98 theories that seek to justify or explain the status quo based on
93. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39, 43 (1985); see also CAROL GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 160 (1982) (finding that her subjects defined their identity in the
context of relationships); Robert A. Josephs et al., Gender and Self-Esteem, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 391, 391 (1992) (finding that women are more likely to
have a "collectivist, ensembled, or connected schema for the self" whereas men are more
likely to have "an individualist, independent, or autonomous schema"). None of these
authors suggests that all women experience a less autonomous sense of self. The collective
work of these authors nonetheless suggests that it is fair to say that, in general, women
tend to define themselves more in relation to others than men do. This may well be
because, in part, social constructions of gender encourage women to feel this way. See
JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 180-82 (2000) (discussing the ideology of
domesticity).
94. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 359 (1997) ("[I]ndividuals' assessments of both the value and the price of
criminal activity are endogenously related to their beliefs about the attitudes and
intentions of others.").
95. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 355-57 (1997) (describing the process of seeking esteem); see also
Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1992).
96. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1479-80 (noting that people often
sacrifice their own self-gain in order to prevent someone else from taking more than her
share). In response to Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, Richard Posner seems to suggest that
because notions of fairness may have evolutionary origins, they serve individuals' self-
interest. Posner, supra note 91, at 1561--64. This may be true in the abstract, but social
norms clearly structure our concrete notion of fairness, whatever our biological
inclinations toward fairness are.
97. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV, 797, 822-23
(1989) (arguing that women choose to take care of children because the social
construction of gender makes them so choose) [hereinafter Williams, Deconstructing
Gender]; Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1607-08 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Gender Wars].
98. Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work- Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in the Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
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evidence that people choose their current situation tend to ignore the
implicit coercion and potentially restrictive social contexts within
which women "choose." 99 Therefore, the fact that someone chooses a
given behavior does not ineluctably mean that he or she benefits from
that behavior.100
To an economist who is at all stung by these feminist criticisms of
selves and choice, evolutionary biology provides a convenient haven.
Evolutionary theory retains Becker's concept of rational
maximization without subjecting itself to the critiques of self or
choice. Biologists do not incorporate a notion of a self. A self is
nothing other than a temporary home for a gene trying to survive. It
may be that killing the self (so as to enable other selves who share the
gene to live) is perfectly consistent with reproductive success.1"1
Instead of the economist's conscious self rationally choosing among
options,"02 the actor for evolutionary biologists is a gene
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815-32 (1990) (arguing that women choose less
lucrative, "feminine" jobs because social norms steer them toward those choices).
99. See Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality, supra note 75, at 29 ("[I]t is easy to deny
conflicts of interest because patriarchy justifies inequalities and injustices, even violence,
in terms of women's choices .... ); Robin West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J.
2117, 2137 (1999) (describing the problems with assuming that because a course of action
is chosen, it is automatically legitimate).
100. As Robin West explains, economists and others who emphasize the importance of
choice often ignore the need to evaluate normatively the content of that choice. Robin
West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L. REV. 384, 388-91 (1985)
(criticizing Posner's "depiction of the morally legitimizing function of consent").
Consenting to a choice should not necessarily validate that choice ethically, and, in a world
with many choices and little normative evaluation, people often crave less choice. Id. at
400-04 (refuting claims that consensual transactions necessarily promote autonomy). To
illustrate her point, West uses Franz Kafka's characters, most of whom choose to be in
their very unfortunate situations. Richard Posner has criticized West's analysis, asserting
that she has not considered "whether enough people are seriously incompetent at coping
with the challenges of life in a free society to justify making society less free." Richard A.
Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1431, 1446 (1985). Posner's criticism simply begs the question of freedom, however.
As the biologists' findings readily demonstrate, a world in which women are free from
state interference is hardly a world in which women are free from male dominance or
sexual coercion or economic exploitation.
101. See DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 100-01.
102. Richard Posner has expressed somewhat contradictory opinions on the
importance of consciousness to economics. In one of his most recent books, he suggests
that "[e]volution deals with unconscious maximizers, the genes; economics [deals] with
conscious maximizers, persons." POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4, at 14. In other
writings, however, he seems to discount, if not flatly reject, the importance of conscious
choice to economics: "Economics is not a theory about consciousness. Behavior is
rational when it conforms to the model of rational choice, whatever the state of mind of
the chooser ...." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (5th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]; see also Posner, supra note 100, at
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unconsciously pursuing different patterns of behavior. Robert Wright
refers to genes as "puppeteers" and bodies (or selves, in which the
genes are housed) as "puppets.""1 3  These puppeteers can lead
individuals to display a whole variety of behaviors, from acting
altruistically (because altruism, as a strategy, can maximize
reproductive potential) 104 to committing infanticide (if they are
uncertain about an offspring's paternity or if resources are too
limited),105 Individuals barely act at all; they react to their genes.
How they react may depend on context and social training, but the
gene is what initiates action. Nor is choice an active process in the
biological scheme because genes do not act consciously. Certain
behaviors just exist and prosper, or not, as the case may be. If they
prosper, they will come to dominate, or come to exist in some sort of
evolutionary stable state. Whatever an individual experiences as the
motivation that leads him or her to act is largely irrelevant."6 The
1431 ("To complain that economics does not paint a realistic picture of the conscious mind
is to miss the point of economics .... ). In LAW AND LITERATURE, Posner states: "The
concern of economics is not with states of mind but with what people do." See RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 190 (1998) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE]. In that same book, however, he suggests that conscious choice is an
essential component of freedom. See id. at 190-205.
103. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 37.
104. See generally ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE
EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998) (discussing the
phenomenon of altruism).
105. See Sarah Blaffer Hrdy & Glenn Hausfater, Comparative and Evolutionary
Perspectives on Infanticide: Introduction and Overview, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 63, at
xiii, xv-xix.
106. Biologists make a critical distinction between what they call ultimate cause and
proximate cause. As Owen Jones describes it,
"[P]roximate causes" describe immediate causes, related to the internal
mechanisms and development that cause an organism to manifest a particular
behavior. They may be defined in terms of physiology and biochemistry, for
example, as well as, at times, an organism's unique developmental-environmental
history. "Ultimate causes," on the other hand, describe evolutionary processes by
which the same behavior came to be commonly observable.... Proximate and
ultimate causes operate together, with all behavior depending on ultimately-
shaped proximate mechanisms.
Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child
Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1128 (1997). Motivation, as the law usually refers to it,
would be considered a proximate cause by biologists. For instance, a stepfather might say
that it was frustration with his stepchild's constant whining that caused him to strike that
child. Biologists would call anger or frustration a proximate cause for the abuse. The
ultimate cause-and the cause that explains why stepparents are so much more likely than
biological parents to abuse their children-is the stepfather's genes' drive to increase their
own chances for survival by eliminating other genes that might compete for resources. See
id. at 1212 (using various behavioral theories to explain a higher rate of child abuse among
stepparents than biological parents).
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action taken and whether it is reproductively successful are what are
important to biologists.
Some biologists will no doubt reject the suggestion that
evolutionary biology subordinates the importance of choice. After
all, one mantra of evolutionary biology is that sexual selection has
favored "choosy" women, that is coy women who are careful in mate
selection.1"7 As Sarah Hrdy has skillfully demonstrated, though,
problems arise even within the biologists' methodological framework
when one assumes that women choose."'8 In fact, given the coercion
that biologists admit females experience,109 to suggest that women
choose their mates seems internally contradictory and more than a
little patronizing. For centuries in Western culture and still extant in
many non-Western cultures, a woman's father or family chose her
mate for her.110 Even after fathers stopped making the initial choices,
a man routinely had to ask the female's father for permission before
he could marry her.' Men still routinely ask women to mate, not
vice versa. Men, not coy women, make the first choice."' At the
margins, women have some say; sometimes they can reject suitors, but
it is not at all clear why biologists insist that she who can sometimes
decline a request has more choice than he who is able to make the
107. See Jones, supra note 3, at 854-55 ("Because indiscriminate copulation is more
costly, on average, to females than to males (because males, but not females, can avoid the
costs of internal gestation), natural selection has generally favored copulation-partner
choosiness in females of internally fertilizing species. Selective females make better use of
a limited number of lifetime reproductive episodes."); see also TRIVERS, supra note 29, at
335-39 (discussing examples of preferential mating by females).
108. Hrdy, Empathy, supra note 32, at 119 (discussing the assumptions underlying
theories about sexual selection); Hrdy, Darwin's Consciousness, supra note 32, at 22-23
("Biologists underestimated the full extent and importance of repressive strategies by
males [that repressed female choice].").
109. See generally Buss, supra note 26, at 296-315 (describing ways in which men
control women's sexuality).
110. Sara F. Mathews Grieco, The Body, Appearance and Sexuality, in A HISTORY OF
WOMEN IN THE WEST III: RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT PARADOXES 46, 69
(Natalie Davis & Arlette Farge eds., 1993) (describing parental control over marriages in
continental Europe from the Middle Ages through the eighteenth century).
111. See, e.g., JOHN DEMOS, A LITrLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN
PLYMOUTH COLONY 152-60 (1971) (explaining the laws punishing those who refused to
get parental consent and the appeal process (to male authorities) used if a father refused
to give consent).
112. Biologists might suggest that making the request is not biologically important for
men because they are not harmed by bad choice: They can simply abandon the mate who
turns out to be a bad choice. Men still do make the first choice, however, and Hrdy's
research suggests that if women were given the opportunity they would make the first
choice also. See Hrdy, Empathy, supra note 32, at 123-29.
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request in the first place.113 What the biologists' story does make
clear is how much power men have to control women's choices.
The bookends of economics and biology thus provide two
extremes. At one end is the self who chooses; at the other is the shell
that reacts. Neither of these extremes provides much comfort to
women. Feminists struggle with the notion of self. For most of the
twentieth century, feminists explored the idea of what a female self
might be. From the literature of Virginia Woolf,"4 to the social
theory of Simone DeBeauvoir,1 1 5 to the practical politics of
consciousness-raising groups,6 one of the primary goals of feminism
has been to celebrate and liberate a self-defining female. Feminism
has asked women to look inside themselves to find their own wants,
fears, and beliefs. It has fought for women to be able to establish
autonomous selves. When looking inside, though, women have found
that the concept of autonomy is far more malleable than economists
presume,117 and scholars have shown how this is particularly true for
women.1 18 The demonstration of that malleability has often carried
with it an implicit normative message about self-interest: The less
boundaried and contained our notion of self, the more giving and
113. Other cultural practices also belie biologists' theories of female choice. If it is
women who choose men, why is it women, not men, who spend millions of dollars every
year trying to enhance their sexual appearance so as to be attractive to the opposite sex?
Richard Dawkins himself noted this abnormality. See DAWKINS, supra note 20, at 178
("Faced with [the modem emphasis on women's appearance], a biologist would be forced
to suspect that he was looking at a society in which females compete for males, rather than
vice versa.").
114. See generally, VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (1929) (suggesting that
the reason women had not made more significant contributions to English literature is
because they were not allowed the space and time necessary for self-examination).
115. See generally, SiMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. &
trans., Penguin Books 1983) (1949) (writing about the characteristics of a "woman").
116. Catharine MacKinnon has described consciousness-raising as "the major
technique of analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of social
change of the women's movement." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 519-20 (1982).
117. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and The Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE
ORDER OF CULTURE 162, 168 (Robert Post ed., 1991) (suggesting that the traditional
assumption that autonomy is boundaried and must be protected from outside harm is
misguided: "[Ajutonomy is a capacity, not a static human characteristic .... [What is
essential to the development of autonomy is not protection against intrusion but
constructive relationship."); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 11 (1989) (concluding that
autonomy originates with self and is conditioned and shaped by social context).
118. Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and The Bounded Self, supra note 117, at 179-81;
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, supra note 117, at
9-10; see also GILLIGAN, supra note 93, at 160; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 93, at 47.
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caring we can become.119 However, that normative message does not
ineluctably lead to a positive or normatixe conclusion that there is
not, or need not be, any sense of autonomous self.
I20
Feminists also struggle with the idea of choice. Economists
emphasize the primacy of choice in determining outcomes, 121 often at
the expense of recognizing the role that social context can play in
predetermining how a person makes a choice. By reducing choice to
the realm of the unconscious, biologists emphasize predetermination
and acknowledge, but subordinate, the role of agency."2 In critiquing
the primacy of choice, however, feminists do not suggest that choice is
necessarily bad any more than they suggest that a notion of self is
necessarily vacuous. They suggest that choice, like self-definition, is a
complicated issue both practically and normatively. To the extent
that social norms all but demand that women choose to take care of
children"z and choose to work in low-paying jobs,2 we have reason
to question whether choice means the same thing to women as to men
in this culture. Moreover, the idea that we must respect people's
choices in the name of autonomy strikes many feminists as hollow
when the normative content of those choices often appears deeply
troubling. Is it moral, appropriate, or permissible for people to
choose subordinating and violent sexual practices?'25 Is it moral,
119. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 24 (1997). West suggests that the ethic of
care identified in Carol Gilligan's work must be part of an ethic of justice. "'[J]ustice,' as
it is generally understood, and 'care,' as it is widely practiced, are each necessary
conditions of the other." Id. Carrie Menkel-Meadow writes that "the growing strength of
women's voice... may change the adversarial system into a more cooperative, less war-
like system of communication between disputants in which solutions are mutually agreed
upon rather than dictated by an outsider, won by the victor, and imposed upon the loser."
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 93, at 54-55.
120. To the extent biology seems to reject a notion of self, feminists have as much
reason to reject it as they do to reject the post-modernists who, to paraphrase Robin West,
force us to deconstruct our selves before we have had a chance to know what we feel like.
WEST, supra note 119, at 291.
121. See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist
Dilemmas to a Reconceptualiziation of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1235, 1254 (1998) ("For the economist, human activity is about making choices.").
122. I use the term "agency" here as Kathryn Abrams has in a variety of her insightful
writings on the subject. Thus, agency involves both a sense of "knowing self-direction"
and an "ability to develop and act on conceptions of oneself." Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars
Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 306 n.11
(1995).
123. See Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 97, at 1599.
124. See Schultz, supra note 98, at 1803.
125. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 127, 127-33 (1987) (analyzing the
harmful impact of pornography).
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appropriate, or permissible that women who work outside the home
still choose to do the overwhelming majority of the housework that
must be done inside the home? 2 6  Is it moral, appropriate, or
permissible that some women choose to have sex with their bosses in
hopes of securing better jobs?127 If the answer to any of these
questions is no, then we must continue to ask why women make these
choices. Feminism is not suggesting, as the biological paradigm all
but does, that choice is irrelevant or unnecessary in people's lives. It
is suggesting that women deserve the opportunity to make
meaningful and ethically appropriate choices.
Nuanced notions of self and choice are well documented in the
feminist dialogue on sexuality. Early writings in the second wave 12 of
twentieth-century feminism focused on how the patriarchal
construction of heterosexuality objectified women,'129 normalized male
sexual violence against women,' 30 and eroticized dominance and
aggression.13' Rape was the predominant, indeed overpowering,
construct through which many prominent feminists told women to
understand their sexuality. Catharine MacKinnon wrote, "[W]omen
live in sexual objectification the way fish live in water.... The
question is, what can life as a woman mean, what can sex mean, to
126. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 48, at 271-78 (discussing research that compares the
relative contributions of working women and men to household chores).
127. Katharine K. Baker, Unwanted Supply, Unwanted Demand, 3 GREEN BAG 2D
SERIES 103, 113 (1999-2000) (questioning the moral propriety of using sex as a bargaining
chip).
128. "Second wave" in this sense refers to the feminist movement of the late twentieth
century, starting somewhere around 1970. There was, of course, a vast literature on
women's sexuality in the early part of the twentieth century also. See CHARLOTTE
PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 5 (1966) ("We are the only animal species
in which the female depends upon the male for food, the only animal species in which sex-
relation is also an economic relation ... of economic dependence upon the other sex.");
EMMA GOLDMAN, THE TRAFFIC IN WOMEN AND OTHER ESSAYS ON FEMINISM 20
(1970) ("Nowhere is woman treated according to the merit of her work, but rather as a
sex. It is therefore almost inevitable that she should pay for her right to exist, to keep a
position in whatever line, with sex favors."). See generally CRYSTAL EASTMAN, ON
WOMEN AND REVOLUTION 47 (Blanche W. Cook ed., 1978) ("Whether we are the special
followers of Alice Paul, or Ruth Law, or Ellen Key, or Olive Schreiner, we must all be
followers of Margaret Sanger. Feminists are not nuns. That should be established.").
129. See MACKINNON, supra note 73, at 204; see also Adrienne Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED
PROSE 1979-1985, at 23 (1986) (stating that compulsory heterosexuality is the way men
enforce subordinate status on all women).
130. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 80, at 309 (arguing that women have "become
indoctrinated into a victim mentality").
131. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24 (1981)
(linking male power and pornography).
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targeted survivors in a rape culture? 1 32 In answering that question,
some feminists looked within themselves to find an answer that was
not all negative. Thus, Robin West suggested that critiques of
sexuality must include an incorporation of what women feel to be
pleasurable. 133 Sometimes, she suggested, sexual submission can be
desirable." Mary Becker suggested that not all forms of sexual
objectification are bad, though many are.135  As Katharine Bartlett
described it, women knew they were "living on someone else's terms
at the same time [they knew] sex [was] exciting.1 136 Those outside of
legal scholarship who rejected the dominance feminist account often
did so asking, to paraphrase Kathryn Abrams, "[W]hat [are we]
supposed to do about sex while [we are] fighting for freedom?'
' 37
Implicit in that question is an understanding that women are free to
do something. They do have some control, some ability to act, to
transgress, or to conform to or to alter slightly the paradigms and
terms that seem to confine them.38 Women, as agents, choose from,
among, and sometimes create new, options. Their choices reflect
their own desires and those of others. They are constrained by social
and patriarchal norms, but they do have selves that recognize and try
to capitalize on better options available. 39 Moreover, as the refusal
to sacrifice their sexual activity suggests, being able to capitalize on
these better options, being able to experiment with their own
132. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149
(1989).
133. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 139-45
(1987) (suggesting a normative model for feminist legal criticism that emphasizes women's
happiness).
134. Id. at 129 ("[S]exual submission has erotic appeal and value when it is an
expression of trust, is damaging, injurious and painful when it is an expression of fear, and
is dangerous because of its ambiguity .... ").
135. Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
165, 191-203 (1997-98) (distinguishing between autonomy-denying objectification and
autonomy-respecting objectification).
136. Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 1559,1563 (1987).
137. Abrams, supra note 122, at 311.
138. Kathryn Addelson suggests that various socialization processes are so powerful
and so pervasive that no one (man or woman) is capable, as an autonomous agent, of
transcending them. Thus, all autonomy or agency is exercised within the confines of
socialized restrictions. KATHRYN PYNE ADDELSON, Autonomy and Respect, in IMPURE
THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY, FEMINISM AND ETHIcS 212,220 (1991).
139. See Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-
Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 832-39 (1999) (exploring how women exercise
some autonomy even within profoundly oppressive contexts, like sexual harassment,
domestic violence, and forced pornography).
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sexuality, even if they are living on someone else's terms, is critical to
the female sense of well-being.
The problem with both the economic and biological use of
maximization therefore is not a reliance on or rejection of (1) an
autonomous notion of self; (2) the existence of an exogenous utility
function; or (3) a free agent who chooses. It is instead the simplistic
assumption that selves, preferences, and choice are simplistic
concepts. Life, particularly female life in a patriarchal culture, is
more complex than that. At some reductionist level, both the
biological and the economic models are undoubtedly accurate. Some
behaviors are, if not absolutely determined genetically, at least very
strongly influenced by our genes. Comparably, almost all people,
even all women, are able to exercise some agency and make some
choices. The question for legal scholarship and policy is whether it is
more important to rely on those truisms or to struggle with the more
murky reality that defines most people's lives. Feminism suggests
that the law must acknowledge and reckon with the muck. In doing
so, it becomes necessary to resist another key component of the
biological and economic maximization methodologies, that is, cost-
benefit analysis. I turn to that next.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
In order to maximize, one must measure, and for that
measurement to be intellectually accessible there must be a defining
metric. For economists, the metric is utility. All choices are and can
be measured in terms of subjective utility. For biologists, the metric is
reproductive success. All behaviors are and can be measured in terms
of reproductive success. Though different metrics, they are both
single metrics along which disciples of the respective disciplines
measure everything. They are also perfect compliments. Utility is, as
one economist explains, "radically subjective,""14 meaning that
interpersonal utility function comparisons are per se impossible.
Between two people in a two-party transaction, determining whether
140. Paula England, The Separate Self. Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical Assumptions,
in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICs 37,42 (Marianne A.
Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993) [hereinafter BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN]. Traditional
economics assumes that interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible. This restriction
is critical to maintaining the simplicity of economics because if one started comparing
utility functions, measurements of well-being would become infinitely more complex. The
assumption that such comparisons are impossible flows from the economist assumption of
a separate self. The more empathy we assume, the more one person is able to measure his
own gain in terms of someone else's gain. Id.
[Vol. 80
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one person benefits more from the transaction than does the other is
impossible because they both voluntarily entered into it.
141
Biologists' understanding of reproductive success, on the other
hand, is radically objective; it only makes sense as a comparative
term. We know that a strategy is successful when it produces more
offspring than other strategies against which it is compared. The
biological analysis pays no heed to whether (and does not presume
that) any given strategy is subjectively beneficial.142 Strategies are
measured without regard to whether they are enjoyed by, good for, or
empowering to the actor.
With their respective common metrics in place, economists and
biologists can set about determining whether individuals are
maximizing by measuring costs and benefits. The simplicity of cost-
benefit analysis is what makes it so appealing to some and so false to
others. 143  As Martha Nussbaum writes, cost-benefit analysis
"flatten[s] and simplifie[s] things that are usually messy and real."'"
It fails to capture "contradictory truths." 145
Those who defend cost-benefit analysis in the economic area
suggest that the messy and contradictory truths that appear to
permeate people's lives are irrelevant to methodologies that simply
measure what people do, not what they aspire to or represent about
their actions.46 Sarah Hrdy defends evolutionary biology in the same
141. In order to develop more complex notions of Pareto-superiority (one person
better off, no one worse off) or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (more total utility to society even
if some people are worse off), one does need to assume some index of comparison against
which one can measure and thereby be able to aggregate utility. See JULES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 100-02 (1988). This rough index need not be
particularly precise, however, and, traditionally, economists have shunned comparing
interpersonal utilities.
The recent work of Mathew Adler and Eric Posner bucks this tradition, arguing
that interpersonal welfare comparisons (though not preference comparisons) are
comparable. Their defense of such comparisons is limited to the administrative agency
context, however, and it is unclear whether they would defend such comparisons if
performed by other legal institutional players (courts or legislatures, for instance). See
Mathew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Re-thinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165,
196,204-09 (1999).
142. As Wright puts it, "[T]he puppeteer [i.e., the gene] seems to have exactly zero
regard for the happiness of the puppets." WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 37.
143. For a recent array of commentary, see Symposium, Law and Incommensurability,
146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1998).
144. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1197, 1200 (1997).
145. Bartlett, supra note 136, at 1563 (critiquing MacKinnon's feminism).
146. Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the
Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1998) ("[T]he
incommensurability thesis often describes people's representations about themselves, it
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terms. "Primatologists pay attention to what animals do, not to what
they say they do."147 These defenses condemn to irrelevance people's
thoughts, beliefs, and feelings. 14s Feminist legal reformers cannot
afford to do this. We learn important lessons about our own strength
and enrichment, and we allow people to experience that strength and
enrichment, when we describe the world in terms of what people say
and feel, as well as in terms of what they do.
49
Those committed to cost-benefit analysis may argue that the
economic and biological models do not describe people's inner lives
because that is not their goal. Their aim is to predict, in general, what
people will do, based on an admittedly artificial construction of the
individual. Neither biology nor economics claims to be able to
predict what any given person will do, nor does either claim to
provide an account of human behavior that explains what gives
people meaning or personal fulfillment. Both simply claim to be
does not describe their actual behavior .... [ThusJ [ijncommensurability claims do not
reflect people's interests and values; they conceal them."); see also POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 102, at 185 ("The concern of economics is not with states of
mind but with what people do."). Eric Posner has recently distanced himself considerably
from the traditional law and economics defense of cost-benefit analysis, arguing that what
is relevant to the cost-benefit equation is not people's expressed preferences, but instead
their overall welfare-which he and his co-author take to be a much broader concept than
expressed preferences and which might be able to capture thoughts, feelings, and beliefs.
See Adler & Posner, supra note 141, at 196-97.
147. HRDY, NEVER EVOLVED, supra note 10, at 9. Of course, most animals do not
have access to language, so they cannot verbalize desires or beliefs that are inconsistent
with their action, but one could well imagine a female ape expressing a desire not to have
to capitulate to a male's desire for intercourse, see supra text accompanying notes 55-60,
despite her ultimate willingness to do so.
148. Some practitioners of law and economics recognize that people's interior thoughts
and feelings do matter. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 603-06 (1998) (stating that the law can induce people to change their internal
preferences and altered internal preferences will alter behavior); Peter H. Huang, Reasons
Within Passions: Affects and Attributions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV.
435, 435 (2000) (observing that emotions affect how people behave); Richard H.
McAdams, Eric Posner's Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms and Economic
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 681 (2001) (book review) (arguing that "normative
motivations matter" to any theory of norms).
149. Donald McCloskey suggests that economists' narrow concept of relevance (what
people do, not what they say) produces a discipline that misses vast amounts of relevant
behavior. Quoting Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, McCloskey explains,
[W]hat is crucial in distinguishing genuine intellectual life from system-building
lunacy is "our ability to engage in continuous conversation, testing one another,
discovering our hidden presuppositions, changing our minds because we have
listened to the voices of our fellows. Lunatics also change their minds, but their
minds change with the tides of the moon and not because they have listened,
really listened, to their friends' questions and objections."
Donald N. McCloskey, Some Consequences of a Conjective Economics, in BEYOND
ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 140, at 69, 85 (citation omitted).
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fairly accurate predictors of aggregate human behavior. No other
discipline, they might argue, can do better predictively. That may be
so, but the problem with making law based on either of these only
partially accurate predictive devices is that in constructing their
prototypical individuals, biology's normative drawbacks and
economics' descriptive drawbacks seem particularly problematic for
women.150  The biological model sees reproductively successful
women as inevitably vulnerable and dependent, regardless of what
women may subjectively desire. The economic model sees women as
autonomous and independent regardless of what women may
subjectively feel. For women, whose actions are very much
circumscribed by cultural norms and potentially violent men,
subjective thoughts, feelings, and desires may well reveal as much or
more about their actual lives as any demonstrated action or any
model that tries to predict that action. 1 The law must appreciate and
incorporate those thoughts, feelings, and desires into legal analysis.
When it fails to do so and roots analysis in the prototypical
parsimonious biological or economic models, the law endorses the
legitimacy of the assumptions that go into those models and may
perpetuate the social conditions that restrict women's lives.1
52
Feminism's need to reject parsimonious models and embrace
people's inner lives may explain why feminist legal scholars have been
particularly drawn to literature and narrative. As Patricia Cain has
written, "[L]istening to women and believing their stories is central to
feminist method." '53 This method has been controversial precisely
because it is messy and does not always render clear prescriptions.
Kathryn Abrams explains:
150. Richard McAdams has suggested that the plausibility of a model's assumptions
should matter if the model's predictive capacity is unclear. "When the predictive power
[of a model) is not known sufficiently to be compared, I think it entirely appropriate to
count the plausibility of assumptions in favor of a theory and the implausibility against it."
McAdams, supra note 148, at 686.
151. See, e.g., Chloe E. Bird, Gender, Household Labor, and Psychological Distress:
The Impact of the Amount and Division of Housework, 41 J. HEALTH AND SOC. BEHAV.
32,42-43 (1999) (finding that the majority of women who do more than half the household
work are not satisfied with the division of labor).
152. Those who consider themselves law and economics scholars acknowledge that the
law can signal the attitudes of a community and affect people's beliefs by doing so. See
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340
(2000). When the law embraces either the economic or the biological models, it
perpetuates the assumptions that form them.
153. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191,195 (1989). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories,
79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (examining the emergence of feminist narrative scholarship as
a distinctive form of critical legal discourse).
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[W]hen mainstream legal scholars read experiential
narrative scholarship, they look for an abstract framework-
a kind of feminist analogue to the Posnerian economic
analysis of law-that transforms the raw data provided by
experiential narratives into the specific legal rules or
proposals. They do not always find what they are looking
for.
154
The world of literature incorporates, without apology,
contradictory truths, divided selves, active submission, and confused
goals. In doing so it reveals a multidimensionality that better
describes people's lives than does the single metric of either
economics or biology. If we really believed that what was important
in life could be measured along a common metric, the world would be
a much different place, and all great literature, if it were true to the
human condition, would read like a dime store novel. Good
literature is good because it is not easy. The characters, their
motivations, and their actions cannot be typed, quickly described, or
measured along one dimension. Literature is meaningful because it is
everything but simple and parsimonious. When we insist on making
legal analysis simple and parsimonious, we miss the reality of people's
lives.
As an example of how we experience life more like literature and
less like economics or biology, consider the institution of marriage.
At some level, some women (and some men) know that marriage, or
a committed relationship, is neither the simple contract that
economists would have us make it,155 nor the binary negotiation for
child-rearing purposes that the biologists describe. 615  Marriage is not
just a commitment that the woman or her family extracts from a man
through bargaining. It is not only an attempt by her to get some of
154. Kathryn Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative, in LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN
REPRESENTING WOMEN: LAW, LITERATURE, AND FEMINISM 44, 47 (Susan Sage
Heinzelman & Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman eds., 1994).
155. GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 43 (1991) (describing marriage as
"a written, oral, or customary long-term contract between a man and a woman to produce
children, food, and other commodities"); see also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW, supra note 102, at 158 ("Commercial partnerships are voluntary contractual
associations, and so, up to a point, are marriages."); ERIC POSNER, LAw AND SOCIAL
NORMS 76 (2000) (explaining that courtship, gift-giving, and even premarital sex are
signaling games in which each party tries to convey that he or she would make a good
long-term mate) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS]; Eric Rasmusen &
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73
IND. L.J. 453, 464 (1998) (suggesting that all marrying couples should choose between a
variety of contracting provisions before marrying).
156. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 86-89.
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the surplus he can provide in return for her bearing his children, or an
attempt by him to secure quality genes and caretaking skill.157 When
men and women subjectively experience a marriage as such (and
some do), it is an inferior and unfortunate one.158  Intimate
connections can and should be experienced as something more
meaningful. As Elizabeth Anderson writes, "the reason it is 'better to
have loved and lost than never to have loved' is not that a lost love on
balance delivers more kicks than a loveless life. It often does not....
[It is] because love invests life with a meaningfulness and depth that a
'happy' but loveless life lacks." '59 That meaningfulness is what is
familiar to us in life and literature. By ignoring or condemning to
irrelevance the importance of internally experienced meaning, both
the economic and the biological concept of maximization rob women
of much of what we know to be most valuable.
Welfare economics has begun to recognize this. In a recent
article, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell suggest that welfare
economics, unlike the conventional view of economics, must
incorporate "everything that an individual might value[, including] ...
social and environmental amenities, personally held notions of
fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth."'" Such a
view is perfectly consistent with feminism's call to listen to women,
but it is hard to reconcile with an extensive use of cost-benefit
analysis. When that which we value is not traded in any kind of
external market, 61 when our thoughts, beliefs, and feelings can
contradict our demonstrated preferences,1 6 and when, in some areas,
157. The law is well aware of this complexity also. Family law scholars have struggled
for decades to figure out whether marriage is more like status or contract. See CALEB
FOOTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 16-23 (A. James Casner et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1985). The Supreme Court, try as it might to describe the institution, has been
reduced to language which can, at best (and possibly proudly), be described as "mushy."
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("[Marriage] is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.").
158. Robert Frank notes that the exchange orientation view of marriage is negatively
correlated with marital satisfaction for both men and women. FRANK, supra note 5, at
200.
159. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 126 (1993).
160. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17, at 980.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 266-67 (describing the unique value of family
labor).
162. Consider Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler's examples of bounded willpower, including,
inter alia, smokers who continue to smoke even though they would prefer not to and
people who prefer to save money but cannot do so without a pre-existing contractual
commitment. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1479.
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we may actually desire to dispense with objective measurements, 6 3
cost-benefit analysis fails to provide us any guidance.
Moreover, only by embracing the complexities of different
meanings can we effectively combat harmful behavior. Rape is an
example of a behavior that can be and has been defined in both
economic terms (rape as theft)164 and biological terms (rape as
procreation without having to incur courtship costs).165 Singular
classifications like this ignore the many different kinds of benefits that
men get from rape and the different kinds of costs that women rape
victims suffer. Rape may be about theft or procreation sometimes,
but it can also be about masculinity and thus about male status.166 It
can be about gender power and thus status vis-a-vis women.167 It can
also be about trying to degrade or destroy other men by raping
"their" women."6 All rapes are not the same to the men who commit
them, to the women who suffer them, or to the societies that judge
them. To treat them as monolithic harms and ignore the multiplicity
of meanings that rape can involve may help make rape fit into a
model, but it seriously detracts from our ability to combat rape for all
that it is.
163. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 345-53 (1986) (observing that
monetization can be intrinsically disvaluable if placing a monetary value on a good is
inconsistent with partaking of that good); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 805 (1994) ("[I]ncommensurability ... is
desirable as a means of maintaining attitudes and relationships that are parts of good
lives."). Matthew Adler argues that such arguments are not strong arguments against
cost-benefit analysis because in many cases where incommensurability does seem to be
disvaluable, accurate cost-benefit analysis is highly unlikely to be reliable anyway.
Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371,
1410-12 (1998). Adler thus recognizes that cost-benefit analysis will not always be an
appropriate form of measurement.
164. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 202 (3d ed. 1986);
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1125-27 (1972);
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1786 (1992). Calabresi has
since rethought the applicability of the theft analogy. See Guido Calabresi, Thoughts on
the Future of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 363-64 (1983)
(commenting that the property analogy may be too simplistic).
165. See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 13, at 190; Jones, supra note 3, at 855.
166. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 673-75
(1999).
167. See Katharine K. Baker, Sexism, Racism and Rape: A Comment on Rape:
Racism,__ NAT'L BLACK LJ. - (forthcoming - ) (describing men who rape out of a
desire to avenge the sense of powerlessness they feel when confronted with women's
sexuality).
168. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist?: Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 563, 607-08 (1997) (describing the use of rape in war).
2002] FEMINISM, EVOLUTION, AND ECONOMICS 501
3. Summary
In sum, then, the conventional economic model of maximization
requires a boundaried, self-interested, rational actor, while the
biological model requires a gene, temporarily housed in a human
shell, whose only goal is to perpetuate itself in other shells. The
economic model also requires individuals to exercise their own
agency and actively choose life courses, while in the biological model,
individuals barely act at all; they react to the dictates of the genes
within them. Despite the different, almost opposite, emphasis that
economics and biology place on the roles of self and choice, both
retain the core principle of maximization. Selves maximize utility.
Behavior choices (and the genes that produce them) maximize
reproductive success. Neither paradigm rings true with the feminist
literature that suggests that women experience a self that is neither
exogenously defined nor empty and a concept of choice that is neither
free nor meaningless. Moreover, many women (and more than a few
men) experience wealth, not as an accumulation of subjective utils or
objective success, but as a connection with emotion and others that is
at once objective and subjective and does not manifest itself in one
metric.
B. Equilibria
The similarities between evolutionary biology and the economic
approach to law are not limited to their parallel reliance on
maximization. Both disciplines also draw critical assumptions about
the meaning of stability. For both biology and economics, stability
suggests equilibria. More important, though, equilibria suggest
optimality. 169  As Mark Roe has explained, the notion that
competition breeds equilibria that are presumptively efficient or
optimal maintains a strong hold on both biology and economics."'
This section explains why the inference of optimality from
stability is pernicious. First, this inference ignores the role that the
law can play in shaping preferences. Second, it ignores how path
169. I will use the term "optimal" to incorporate both the economic understanding of
efficiency and the biological understanding of evolutionary advantage.
170. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 641 (1996) ("The classical evolutionary paradigm has a strong grip on law and
economics scholarship. What survives is presumptively efficient .... "). The strength of
the classical evolutionary paradigm's grip may depend on the kind of law and economics
scholarship. Price theory strongly suggests the optimality of equilibria, but much of game
theory questions the existence of stable equilibria. See infra text accompanying notes 208-
09.
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dependence can readily explain stability. Once one accepts either the
fluidity of preferences or the prevalence of path dependence, the
utility of both economics and biology dissipates. Traditional
economic models have little predictive power when preferences
fluctuate. Biology has little explanatory power if politics, not
genetics, can just as readily account for the facts as we know them.1
7 1
1. Norms and Preferences
The law helps shape preferences by reinforcing and/or creating
and/or undermining social norms. Law and economics scholarship
has recognized the importance of norms for some time, but often this
scholarship has focused on norms that exist to supplant law, not
norms that the law itself helps to create.17 The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law describes three kinds of norms:
equilibrium-selection norms, rationality-limiting norms, and
preference-changing norms.73 The social norms of driving on the
right side of the road in the United States and on the left in Britain
are examples of equilibrium-selection norms. These are norms that
develop in response to situations in which some equilibria are
necessary for efficiency reasons, but no rational reason exists for
people to prefer one norm over another. Conforming to an
equilibrium-selection norm is perfectly compatible with self-interest.
Rationality-limiting norms, on the other hand, are norms that keep
people from doing what would be in their interest simply because
society tells us that "it is not done." Norms setting expectations of
politeness or norms requiring men to wear neckties would be
examples of rationality-limiting norms. Preference-changing norms
are norms that actually change people's preferences. One can start
getting to work at 8:00 a.m. merely because everyone else does so, but
then come to prefer the 8:00 a.m. arrival time.
The economic account of human interaction suggests that most
norms are equilibrium-selection norms.174 They are norms that
171. For a discussion of whether a theory's success should be marked by its ability to
predict or its ability to explain, see David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven
Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REv. 1001, 1011-12 (1996).
172. One of the classic accounts in the legal scholarship is ROBERT ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES (1991).
173. Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw VOL. 3, at 476,476-77 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
174. Ia at 477 (reporting that the equilibrium-selection norm "is currently in vogue in
economics and has generated a lot of literature, to the extent that economists tend to
forget about the other kinds of norms-conveniently so, since the equilibrium-selection
norm is the one which is most compatible with conventional economics"). For examples
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develop to facilitate interaction or overall welfare-maximization. 175
Thus, an economist might well suggest that the norms surrounding
gender are equilibrium-selection norms. Social norms may encourage
women to be intuitive, relationship-oriented, and communitarian,
while they encourage men to be rational, independent, and
hierarchical, because this division of behavioral characteristics
facilitates many aspects of social interaction, including (probably
most importantly, but not exclusively) mating behavior. According to
this account, women are better off acting feminine and doing the
work that women are supposed to do and then getting rewarded by
men (with resources), while men are better off competing with each
other and establishing their own autonomy so that they can garner
maximum resources and get the most desirable women.176
Conforming to gender norms is thus perfectly compatible with each
individual's self-interest.
A feminist account of patriarchy, though, suggests that many
gender norms are rationality-limiting norms. They are norms
enforced by those that benefit from them,177 and they are not
necessarily compatible with everyone's self-interest. Thus, a feminist
would argue that those who have a stake in the status quo of gender
prefer adherence to gender norms. Gender norms give men more
access to social power, resources, and even reproductive
opportunity.178 Women who try to transgress these norms by being
of economists' explication of equilibrium-selection norms, see generally ELLICKSON,
supra note 172 (describing norms that allow ranchers and farmers in Shasta County,
California, to co-exist with little litigation or constant dispute); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) (describing norms that facilitate efficient operations
among merchants).
175. For instance, Eric Posner suggests that many norms that appear to be rationality
limiting may actually be signaling norms, meaning that complying with them is a way of
signaling to other people. See generally POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note
155 (stating that people act in accordance with certain norms as a means of communicating
their intent to cooperate and honor agreements). If rationality-limiting norms are really
signaling norms, then they are not contrary to one's self-interest.
176. Ellickson might describe the gendered division of labor as a kind of specialized
labor game. See ELLICKSON, supra note 172, at 162-64.
177. Ellickson readily concedes that some norms that "add to the welfare of the
members of a certain group commonly impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that
group." Id at 169. Ellickson uses the example of Jim Crow laws to demonstrate this
operation of norms.
178. Norms tend to be much more forgiving of the philanderer male than the
philanderer female and, notwithstanding the biological theory of female choice, see supra
text accompanying notes 29-30, they give men the role of choosing a female sexual
partner. See BEM, supra note 84, at 163 ("[B]oth women and men see it as normal and
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assertive, autonomous, or "malelike" in any way are often scorned
because those with social power try to ensure that everyone comes to
internalize an allegiance to gender norms, even if those norms are
rationality-limiting for some.79
Meanwhile, the feminist normative agenda suggests that the law's
role is to encourage preference-changing norms. Norms of equality
and attempts to implement those norms legally, with laws like Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964180 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1970,181 are examples of preference-changing norms.
Consider the example of Title IX. One could argue, as Richard
Posner has about the Virginia Military Institute case,lu that the
failure of women to express an interest in a given activity all but
answers the question as to whether it is important for the law to
afford them the opportunity to pursue that activity.'13 Under a
traditional economic approach, the question becomes whether
women's demonstrated preferences prove that they are being denied
something that they want."s  This approach ignores the ability of
natural for the male to play a more dominant or assertive role in a heterosexual
encounter....")-
179. In the late nineteenth century, sexologists and psychologists claimed that feminists
suffered from sexual inversion because they expressed a desire to have that which was
associated with men and masculinity. See BEM, supra note 84, at 82-86. Today, social
norms still clearly encourage people to conform to gender norms. Id. at 148. Given that
masculinity seems to be associated with those qualities that make individuals most capable
of garnering resources, including material wealth and political power, it would seem to be
clearly advantageous to men to instill an aversion to gender transgression.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1994).
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
182. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
183. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4, at 171 ("The entire harm to women was
the difference between the value of a VMI education and that of the education in the
substitute program that the state had created for women, multiplied by the very small
number of women who would like to attend VMI.").
184. Id. Posner argues that because Virginia provided a scantily attended alternative
military school for women, women were able to get military training if they wanted it.
According to his analysis, no rationality-limiting norms inhibited women's participation in
military training because the attendance at the all-female school indicated that only a few
women's interests would be served by providing a VMI education. Posner's argument
here is similar to one made by Richard Epstein, several years earlier, justifying the
statutory schemes at issue in Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (both of which assumed that wives were dependent on their
husbands but made husbands prove that they were dependent on their wives), by noting
how relatively uncommon it was for husbands to be dependent on their wives. See
Richard A. Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist Thought, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
331, 342 (1995).
The tendency to try to maximize people's utility as measured through their
revealed or demonstrated preferences is a classic component of conventional law and
economics. See COLEMAN, supra note 141, at 130-32 (1988) (stating that the normative
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supply to create its own demand. Laws that afford people new
opportunities help alter rationality-limiting norms that previously
suggested that those opportunities should not be pursued.
1
In 1972, prior to the passage of Title IX of the Education
Amendment Act of 1972, approximately 300,000 girls participated in
high school sports. Today, 2.57 million girls participate. 6 Less than
ten years after Title IX passed, in the 1981-82 school year, 91,986
women participated in NAIA and NCAA college sports programs.
By 1994-95, that number had increased to 129,376, a forty-two
percent increase.187 Anyone awake in the United States in the
summer of 1999 was also well aware of the groundswell of support
from women, men, boys, and girls for the United States Women's
World Cup Soccer Team."8 The members of that team explicitly
credited Title IX with affording them an opportunity to discover that
they wanted to pursue soccer seriously.1 9 It is hard to imagine a
better example of supply creating its own demand, both for the
participants and for the fans. Title IX changed people's
preferences.190
component of law and economics suggests that the maximization of people's expressed
preferences is a, if not the only, legitimate goal for law to facilitate); Jolls, Sunstein, &
Thaler, supra note 14, at 1474-75 (asserting that conventional law and economics analysis
suggests that "the goal of the legal system is to maximize 'social welfare,' usually measured
by people's revealed preferences").
185. Another way to think about this phenomenon is as an endowment effect problem.
People demand that which they feel entitled to and not that which they do not.
186. Donna Lopiano, Equity in Women's Sports-A Health and Fairness Perspective, at
http:/vw.womenssportsfoundation.orglcgi-bin/iowa/issues/rightsarticle.htm?record=121
(last visited Sept. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
187. GENDER EQUITY IN SPORTS, TITLE IX RESOURCES: RELATED STATISTICS, at
http:/Ibaiiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
188. The 1999 Women's Soccer World Cup edged out the NBA finals in the Nielsen
ratings by 390,000 households. And Strong TV Ratings, Too, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 1999, at
D2.
189. Donna de Varona, chair of the 1999 Women's World Cup, said that the U.S.
team's success is the result of "the seeds planted 25 years ago." Josh Peter, Worth More
Than a Million, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 12, 1999, at D1, available at 1999
WL 19750720. She explained, "The U.S. women's soccer team represents to me the
progress that has been made in women's sports since my time. Our team is made up of
Title IX babies. They are the first generation of athletes to benefit from a university and
college sports program that supports them." Donna de Varona, Women's Standard is
Lifted to New Level by World Cup, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 1999, at 3E, available at 1999
WL 6849759.
190. Some might argue that Title IX did not change women's preferences, it merely
removed the obstacles (i.e., discriminatory funding) that prevented women from acting on
their preferences. Although this is possible, it seems unlikely. Campuses that are now
hotbeds of women's basketball and soccer (such as the University of Tennessee, the
University of Connecticut, and the University of North Carolina) were not hotbeds of
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Admittedly, on average women have traditionally expressed less
of a taste for athletics than have men, just as, on average, women
have demonstrated less of a taste for military training than have men.
Biology explains why this would be so. Economics provides the
graphs of expressed preferences that demonstrate why we therefore
have the sports and military institutions that we have. But the Title
IX evidence strongly suggests that whatever biological reason
explains the differential in men's and women's tastes, and however
our existing institutions reflect those preferences, preferences can
change. Once one acknowledges the role that the law can play in
changing preferences,' the importance of the equilibria modeled by
existing preferences and the inferences that one can draw from those
equilibria decline significantly.192
Jonathan Gruber's study of mandatory childbirth benefits 93
provides another example of how legal mandates may generate
preference-changing norms. Gruber's study showed that the
imposition of mandatory maternity benefits terms in labor contracts
did not lead (as traditional economic theory would predict that it
would) to decreased employment or lower wages." As Jolls,
Sunstein, and Thaler point out, these findings suggest that mandatory
labor terms may do more than simply shift the labor demand curve in
feminist activism. Women at those universities did not demand that discriminatory
funding be removed so that they could act on their preferences any more than school-age
girls did. Instead, the law's endorsement of more abstract notions of women's equality, as
embodied in laws like Title IX, forced schools to provide opportunities that girls had not
known they wanted. In other words, the law changed behavior. For an explication of a
theory of how the law can affect such change through norms, see generally McAdams,
supra note 152.
191. The United States Supreme Court has noted the ability of law to change
preferences in this way. In Craig v. Boren, the Court rejected Oklahoma's argument that
statistical evidence legitimated a law imposing different drinking ages on men and women
because the statistics demonstrated that males were more likely than females to drink
excessively and drive while drunk. 429 U.S. 190, 201-04 (1976) ("[P]roving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business and one that inevitably is in
tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.").
192. Thus, the question in VMI cannot be whether the demonstrated preferences of
women indicate that exclusion would cause harm, because the exclusionary rule itself
dampens preferences.
193. Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 622,622-41 (1994).
194. See id. at 639. The conventional economic argument posits that if workers valued
maternity benefits more than employers resisted their costs, they would have been offered
in private contracts without any mandate because the parties would have bargained to
reach a mutually agreeable outcome. To impose mandatory terms in a situation in which
the parties have not previously bargained for them will decrease workers' wages by an
amount somewhere between the benefit and the cost of the mandatory term, and it will
decrease the demand for workers because the price for workers will rise.
2002] FEMINISM, EVOLUTION, AND ECONOMICS 507
(because the cost of labor rises); they may simultaneously shift the
labor supply curve out.195 In other words, without fully realizing this
before the preference-changing norm was mandated, more people
were willing to work if they got maternity benefits. Thus, the data
suggests that women's preference for maternity benefits, like their
preference for sports programs, can be affected by their sense of
entitlement.196
Men's preferences also can be changed. By failing to incorporate
normative programs to alter preferences, those using biology to
influence law tend to offer policy suggestions that accept, as given,
male demand or preference for perverse behaviors. Thus, Randy
Thornhill and Craig Palmer, two leading biological researchers on
rape, suggest educational programs that teach young women about
how "clothing and makeup ... may influence the likelihood of
rape." 197 Owen Jones, who has written on the legal implications of
evolutionary analysis for both rape and child abuse, suggests a series
of preventative strategies for child abuse, all of which involve
subjecting stepparents to special scrutiny.198 Kingsley Browne argues
that sexual harassment law must accept as given the fact that men see
situations as "more sexually oriented than women do" because they
see the world "through sexual glasses."1 99  All of these proposals
demonstrate a disturbing willingness to accept men's current
inclinations to rape and abuse women and children. By focusing on
genetic inclinations as given, biologists methodologically ignore the
extent to which the law is capable of changing internalized norms and
hence preferences." °
Such a focus is too narrow. If the only goal is reducing abuse,
then anyone familiar with statistics on child abuse will readily
195. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1507. The authors are careful to point
out that Gruber's results do not necessarily demonstrate that people's preferences
changed, but a changed preference theory is consistent with the data.
196. Some might argue that without the mandatory benefits, women were simply too
afraid to ask for childbirth benefits for fear they would not be hired in the first place.
Again, this may be so, but research into endowment effects suggests that our preferences
can be shaped by our sense of entitlement. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler view the mandatory
maternity benefits story as an example of the endowment effect. Once people receive
maternity benefits automatically, they value them more highly than if they had never
received them at all. See id.
197. THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 13, at 181.
198. Jones, supra note 106, at 1234-35. Jones, unlike Thornhill and Palmer, recognizes
that policies that emphasize prevention at the expense of stigmatization may involve costs.
199. Kingsley R. Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment: Seeking
Roots in Biology Rather than Ideology, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5,23 (1997).
200. Or, as Richard McAdams puts it, "[L]aw matters for what it says in addition to
what it does." McAdams, supra note 152, at 373.
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conclude that we should simply keep men away from children. °1
Reducing abuse isn't the only goal, however. Women and children
(and probably more than a few men) want to encourage men to be
responsible, loving caretakers for children.2' Similarly, if the only
goal is reducing rape, then restricting or regulating men's access to
women might be a logical strategy, but the feminist goal to reduce
rape is not just rooted in protecting women against potential danger
and unwanted offspring. It is also rooted in getting men to respect
women's physical and sexual integrity. Feminists do not want to just
punish men who are inclined to rape or abuse; they want to alter
those inclinations. 3 Feminist legal reformers, like most people alive,
have multiple ends.' Some of these ends involve changing
preferences as given, even if these preferences have a biological
origin.
Game theory, upon which both economics and biology have
come to rely, can exacerbate this tendency to accept preferences as
given.20 5 By focusing on strategies that individual players can use to
achieve the best available end, game theorists focus on which
available options are best, not on what options could possibly be.
Preference-changing norms try to change or multiply the options
available in games. Sometimes these new options lead to more
201. Ninety-seven percent of the offenders in jail for child abuse are men. LAWRENCE
A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS
AND THEIR VICTIMS, at iv (1996). This statistic is particularly alarming given how much
more time women spend with children. See Becker, supra note 48, at 166.
202. See Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1495, 1519 (1997) (reviewing MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995))
("What [many] women most want is an opportunity to share the job of caretaking with
other people.").
203. This is also a classic problem in the domestic abuse area when women victims are
unwilling to simply abandon their relationships even if that were the most likely way to get
the abuser to stop. They want their partners to stop abusing them and they want the
relationship to survive. "Many women victims want their abusers to change more than
they want the relationship to end." Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse,
110 YALE LJ. 1459, 1490 (2001).
204. Martha Nussbaum argues that the failure of the law and economics movement to
incorporate the existence of a plurality of ends is one of its main shortcomings.
Nussbaum, supra note 144, at 1202-05.
205. For some extensive examples of the economic use of game theory, see DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW passim (1994); HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS passim (John Kasel & Alvin Roth eds., 1994). For examples
of the biological use, see DAWKINS, supra note 20, SMITH, supra note 45; Mealey, supra
note 54, at 228 ("One of the most important theoretical advances in the life sciences
during the last few decades is the introduction of mathematical game theory into
evolutionary biology and the social sciences."); and text accompanying supra notes 46-54.
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desirable (though imagined) equilibria. Sometimes new options just
render the games too complex to produce any predominant
equilibria. This can be a problem for game theorists because for
game theory to be a useful predictive device, it must produce an
equilibrium from which one can draw conclusions. As others have
analyzed, the more that games incorporate the complex, imperfect
lives and options of real-life players, the greater the potential for
multiple equilibria.206 Multiple equilibria do not provide simple and
parsimonious answers; they often fail to provide any "answer" at
all.2 07
In fairness, much of the work being done in game theory
undercuts, rather than reinforces, the presumption of optimality from
equilibria. "Game theoretic analysis demonstrates rigorously that
under at least certain assumptions markets can fail to promote social
welfare." 208  When people act strategically, markets often fail to
produce efficient equilibria. This means that advocates of
nonintervention must find some reason besides optimality to support
the status quo.209 Thus, rigorous use of game theory can reinforce
feminist calls to change rather than to accept the status quo.
Comparably, rigorous analysis of endowments can help reveal the
ways in which people's preferences are shaped by their sense of
entitlement and thus reinforce feminist calls to increase women's
entitlements. The point is not that economics can never help
feminism, but that the biological and economic tendency to rely on
equilibria resulting from demonstrated preferences seriously detracts
from feminist needs to alter preferences.
By definition, preference-changing norms change preferences.
Therefore, by definition, they shift utility functions, which in turn
shift equilibria. Traditional economic models show how equilibria
emerge by focusing on preferences as given. Biological models
explain why those preferences would have emerged and converged at
206. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1298-1304
(1990) (reviewing ERIc RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY (1989)).
207. Game theory also confronts the problems with unitary metrics discussed supra
Part II.A.2. Recall Dawkins's game theoretic explanation of mating strategies. See supra
text accompanying notes 46-54. The only way Dawkins's game could have any predictive
potential was for him to assign cost-benefit numbers to possibilities that many people are
not accustomed to commodifying and comparing. Thus, it strikes some as odd to compare
the benefits of raising a child (and commodify it at +15) with financial and temporal costs
of dating (-3). One cannot play the game without assumptions about comparability, even
if the real life players never think in terms of that comparability.
208. Ayres, supra note 206, at 1315-16.
209. Id.
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that equilibria. Neither of these theories is necessarily bad in the
sense of being wrong, but to the extent that both theories' modeling
power depends on stable preferences, they tend to ignore how
preferences can change. This may be particularly problematic when
considering issues of gender, because if one accepts, at a minimum,
that women have been deprived of access to social, political, and
resource power, then their preferences, even if evolved somewhat, are
not likely to reflect what their preferences could be in a world in
which they had more power. 1 Thus, feminists who start from a
baseline assumption that the world could be a more just and safe
place for women have limited use for these equilibria. The purpose
of feminism and feminist legal reforms is to institute laws and
practices that act as preference-changing norms so that we can move
those equilibria in or out in a way that better protects women's
interests.
2. Paths and Politics
The second reason why modeling the equilibria produced by
demonstrated behavior is of little use to feminist law reform is that
these models tend to discount the potential role of path dependence.
Path dependence is the tendency to follow a path, not because it is a
more efficient or more desirable or a more rewarding means of
getting from point A to point B, but because it exists. Mark Roe uses
the example of a path formed by a fur trader who pioneers a
circuitous route in order to avoid wolves' dens and other natural
dangers.2 1 Future travelers follow the trader's path with wagons and
carriages because taking the worn path is easier. The more the path
gets worn, the greater its advantage, relative to a never-worn route.
Eventually, factories, homes, and towns grow up along the path even
though the dangers that originally determined its route have long
since disappeared.
A circuitous fur-trade-path-turned-highway suggests that the
paths we take may not be optimally efficient. Instead of presuming,
therefore, that given the opportunity to choose, individuals will
gravitate toward optimally efficient behavior, it behooves us to
analyze the potential for path dependence. According to Roe, there
are three reasons why path dependence often withstands competitive
210. As Part II.A suggests, though, neither can one assume that women's preferences
and choices will be the same as those of men who have had access to power. The self that
men experience does not appear to be the same self that women experience.
211. See Roe, supra note 170, at 643.
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pressure. The first problem is one of "imagination, of which we never
have enough. 2 12 The second reason is that the path taken simply did
not matter that much to success, so sufficient incentive to change
paths never emerged, even if an alternative might be marginally more
successful.213 Energies were better spent elsewhere. The third reason
is that various laws prohibit deviation from the standard path.214 All
three of these explanations could explain why various women's
movements and the simple evolutionary course have failed to
significantly undermine our system of gender.
First, when women imagine a different world, they are often
ridiculed. For instance, Richard Posner, in discussing Victoria
Woodhull's nineteenth-century idea of free love, suggested that it
"was not progressive or prophetic; given the conditions of life at the
time, it was daft, because there was no social safety net to break the
fall of women abandoned by their husbands. 2 15 Roe writes that "[i]f
the climate of opinion about a system does not admit the possibility of
radical alternatives, even small-scale evolution might not emerge. "216
Feminists readily concur in the need for these alternative visions.
Martha Nussbaum writes: "[W]e make progress by comparing our
present set of options (unfavorably) with another imaginable
set ....,217 Robin West suggests that "[tlhe future of community
depends not just upon political or even revolutionary action. It also
depends upon our imaginative.., freedom to break free of our
present, and to conceive of other ideal worlds. 2 8  If prominent
economic thinkers like Richard Posner still dismiss as daft the ideas
of (now seemingly) visionary women of 100 years ago, it is hard to
believe we have a climate of opinion that allows even small-scale
evolution to emerge.
Second, given the costs of undermining our gender system,
women may not have had sufficient incentive to alter the path. To
fully challenge a system of gender, even one that clearly subordinates
women, women must confront, alienate, and take power from men.
In doing so, they must put at risk that which they value tremendously.
For instance, until very recently, challenging gender roles meant
212. Id. at 659.
213. Ia-
214. Id. at 660.
215. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 4, at 166.
216. Roe, supra note 170, at 659-60.
217. Nussbaum, supra note 144, at 1203.
218. Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal
Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145,202 (1985).
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putting at risk one's opportunity to have children 19 It still means
risking the opportunity to raise a child with someone genetically
related to the child. It means jeopardizing one's chances of having a
meaningful, potentially rewarding emotional relationship with a man.
For some, it means subordinating or ignoring a desire for
heterosexual sex.
Political power, economic opportunity, physical strength,
freedom to express oneself-all these things are very important to
women, but it is possible, perhaps even likely, that cumulatively they
are not as important as that which women put in jeopardy by
challenging the system of gender. This recognition does not prove
that the status quo is either optimal or efficient, nor does it suggest
that feminists are wrong when they detail the extent of male
dominance. But it does suggest that the stakes in this game are so
high that women may be willing to live in a world that is, to say the
least, suboptimal. Given the costs of challenging the system, women
may lack sufficient incentive to do so, even if they strongly suspect
that they would benefit from a successful challenge.
Finally, of course, Roe's third idea for why competition may not
produce more efficient forms-that laws prohibit the development of
alternatives-is so patently applicable to women's situation that it
hardly needs explication.2 A myriad of laws has prevented women
from deviating from the standard gender paths. Married women were
not allowed to own property until, at the earliest, 1839.221 Women
were not allowed to practice law in federal courts until 18 79 .22 They
were not allowed to vote until 1920.P Girls could not play Little
League until 1974.224 In a world with this many proscriptions on
women displaying non-feminine behavior, that women have followed
traditionally feminine paths is no surprise.
The strong potential for path dependence with regard to gender
suggests that although genetics may be able to explain our gender
219. The availability of artificial insemination services is changing this for people who
can afford them.
220. Roe, supra note 170, at 659-60.
221. The first Married Women's Property acts were passed in Mississippi in 1839 and
New York in 1848. See BETH MILLSTEIN & JEANNE BODIN, WE THE AMERICAN
WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 113-15 (1977).
222. See WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE NEW DEAL
259-65 (Marlene Stein Wortman ed., 1985).
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
224. Little League Baseball, Inc. amended its national charter in 1974 to allow girls to
play. Little League Baseball Historical Timeline, at http://www.littleleague.orglhistoryl
index.htm (last visited November 4, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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preferences, it does not necessarily do so. Much of evolutionary
biology and neoclassical economics, and particularly the disciplines'
claims with regard to gender, are unfalsifiable. 5 Path dependence
explanations are comparably unfalsifiable, but that just means that
one must be careful to explore all potential explanations before
relying too much on either economics or biology.
Again, in fairness, it must be noted that many biologists readily
concede that culture can play as large a role as genetics in shaping our
preferences and steering us toward particular paths. Some biologists
studying the interrelationship between genes and culture suggest that
although certain behaviors are probably best explained by the
biological model, others are better explained by cultural
conditioning.26 These same biologists point out that "our inability to
make precise measurements of the [ influence of culture, genes, and
learning" makes identifying exactly which behaviors are the result of
biological predisposition difficult.2 7 This conclusion undermines the
normative propriety and practical use of making policy based on
theories of biological predisposition. Moreover, a good deal of
environmental literature suggests that traditional ideas about stasis
and equilibria are inaccurate. 2  Any kind of equilibria we see in
nature is temporary because change is an inevitable part of nature.p2
The idea that our biological predispositions would work themselves
into constant behavioral patterns from which we can presume
optimality is undermined by the now well-established nonequilibrium
paradigm? 0
Thus, literature within biology refutes the presumption of
optimality from equilibria just as literature within economics
225. Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1600. See generally KARL R. POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONs: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (2d
ed. 1965) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability.").
226. BOYD & RICHERSON, supra note 13, at 202.
227. Id. at 39. That "inability to make precise measurements" is also what makes cost-
benefit analysis so problematic.
228. See generally First Annual Cummings Colloquium on Environmental Law,
Beyond the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New Ecology, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (1996) (featuring a variety of articles describing the inaccuracies
of previous assumptions about balances and equilibria in nature).
229. See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 188-92 (1990) (observing that natural environmental
conditions are constantly evolving).
230. For more on the nonequilibrium paradigm, see A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law,
27 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1128-31 (1994) (describing and endorsing movement toward a
nonequilibrium paradigm in environmental law).
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undermines the same presumption231  Nonetheless, many
practitioners of each discipline continue to make such
presumptions.2 2  When made with regard to gender roles, those
presumptions are particularly dangerous. Gender roles are universal,
prevalent, and resilient. Many economists and biologists see this
universal stability and they see answers. They offer policy solutions
based on the stability that they see. Feminists observe that stability
and see questions because feminists, a priori, question the legitimacy
of that stability. Feminists question that stability because they see too
much positive potential in a world in which social roles, goods, and
preferences are distributed differently. Thus, stability seems to be as
much an obstacle as an answer. The next section explores one area in
which it is particularly important for the law to overcome stable
gender norms. In doing so, the law must also incorporate nuanced
notions of self and choice and reject the utility of a common metric.
III. BIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: THE CASE STUDY OF
DOMESTIC LABOR
The above analysis makes clear that much of the legal critique of
sociobiobology is the legal critique of law and economics. The
extensive criticisms of both unitary metrics' 3 and presumptions of
optimality2 apply to sociobiology just as easily as they apply to
traditional law and economics. Moreover, both disciplines diverge
from feminist method in parallel ways. Neither discipline can provide
women with what they need from the law, which is not a simple or
parsimonious model, but is instead an acceptance of the complexity of
self and choice and a rejection of unitary metricsYs This section
231. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 94-95 (1990); W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms
in Economics, 5 SANTA FE INST. STUD. IN THE SCI. OF COMPLEXITY: THE ECON. AS AN
EVOLVING COMPLEX SYS. 9, 10-11 (Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 1988); Ayres, supra
note 207, at 1315-18.
232. For the biologists, see generally THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 13; Browne,
supra notes 3 and 199; and Jones, supra notes 3 and 106. For the economists, see supra
note 184 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 159, at 126, and accompanying text; Nussbaum,
supra note 144, at 1200, and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 231.
235. Donald McCloskey makes this point about rigor somewhat differently.
I am not suggesting ... that there is some error in the proofs that civil society can
be derived from axioms of selfishness. They are "right" when they are right. But
they are right in such a narrow sense, so removed from the concerns of a
community that already has approximate equilibrium and already has a
semblance of civility, that someone not half in love with easeful narrowness
would wonder what the fuss is all about.
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explores the limitations of both the biological and the economic
model as they apply to one legal area of special import to women:
domestic labor.
A. Selves and Choice
Legal solutions offered by those well-versed in the biological
paradigm tend, not surprisingly, to assume little agency and minimal
choice. Accordingly, their policies emphasize restricting social
context, not empowering individuals. Thus, one gets proposals like
restricting women's dress as a means of rape prevention,2 6 restricting
stepfathers' access to children as a means of child-abuse prevention, 2
7
and limiting the integration of the armed forces as a means of
reducing sexual harassment.S All of these proposals subordinate any
normative desire to promote autonomy and choice. This fits the
avidly non-normative biological paradigm, but it should seem
particularly unfortunate to economists who tend to endorse the
normative propriety of autonomy and choice. 9 On the other hand, if
one assumes, as economists tend to, both autonomy and choice, one
ignores the relevance of social context2 40 Given the powerful
biological account of just how restricted and sexually violent the
world is for females, this strategy seems comparably unacceptable.
What women need is respect for and encouragement of their
potential autonomy and agency, with an acknowledgment of the
coercive conditions that often rob their choices of much meaning.
For years, the legal model of womanhood was the biological
model. The law treated women as reproductive vessels, motivated by
a desire to reproduce and care for children, and dependent on men
for resources. Thus, the Supreme Court case of Bradwell v. Illinois2 41
stated:
McCloskey, supra note 149, at 86.
236. See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 13, at 181.
237. See Jones, supra note 106, at 1234-35.
238. See Lionel Tiger, Comment on Article by Professor Browne, 8 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 79, 81 (1997) ("In effect I am suggesting that the creation of a hostile
environment is precisely not the responsibility of those who engage in wholly predictable
human behavior, but of those who cause them to exist in [integrated] conditions . ").
239. See Posner, supra note 100, at 1446 (implying strongly that the freedom
experienced by being able to make choices is well worth whatever costs may come from
enabling many choices).
240. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (Epstein and Posner making legal
policy suggestions based on women's expressed preferences).
241. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution
of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood.
242
It made sense, with this biological model, that women were not
allowed to own property or vote and, for the most part, that their
legal status was subsumed into that of their father or husband.
Women were also prevented from entering into binding contracts
with the people on whom they depended most, their husbands.
2 43
The situation today is quite different, of course. Women can
vote and own property. They can enter into most contracts with their
spouses.244 Employers are not permitted to discriminate against
women simply because women might get pregnant, nor are they
allowed to fire women who become pregnant.245 At divorce, women
are treated as individuals, capable of surviving on their own and
responsible for any past choices that might render them less
economically productive. To the extent that divorced women are still
dependent on their spouses, the expressed goal of modern spousal
support programs is to allow the woman to "rehabilitate" her
dependent self into a state of independence.14 6 In other words, there
has been a shift from biology to economics. Women are no longer
vessels, consigned by nature to the domestic sphere; they are fully
242. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
243. The most famous example is Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (1919) (holding that a
wife could not enforce a husband's promise that he support her while she stayed in
England to recuperate after an illness).
244. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS 343 (1982) (stating that both husbands
and wives may validly contract for services not essential to the marital relation). But see
Borelli v. Brousseau, 654, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (1993) (holding that a contract for care
fails for lack of consideration).
245. Congress amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1994)).
246. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 308 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 446
(1998) (defining the conditions under which a court may order maintenance to a spouse
and the standards for setting the level of support); Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for
Security: Paying Married Women What They've Earned, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1193, 1202-03
(1988).
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independent actors, capable of making autonomous decisions and
leading independent lives.
The knotty problem, though, is that women routinely make
choices that render them dependent. They follow their husband's job
instead of their own 47 They spend close to twice as much time as
men do performing non-paid household tasks.248 This holds true
regardless of whether women work outside the home. 49 Often,
women sacrifice more or better-paid work in order to do this
household laborY They sacrifice their own ability to care for
themselves financially in order to care for their spouse and children. 1
They routinely care for their children with such emotional intensity
that the boundary between self and other blursl 2 Many women still
literally change their legal identity in order to adopt their husband's
name once married. Thus, there is an important irony in the law's
switch from the biological to the economic model of the female self:
Although women are now free to make choices in pursuit of their
own independence and self-interest, as a group, women consistently
make choices that land them in non-autonomous conditions of
dependence.
Not all women make these choices, of course. Some women are
primary breadwinners in a two-earner household. Some women
parent without any men around, thus tending to sacrifice for their
247. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between
Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 845 n.271 (1992-93).
248. See SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE
APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 7-9 (1985); VICTOR R. FUCHS,
WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 77-78 (1988); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 48,
at 3-10 (1989); BETH ANNE SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN AND TIME: GENDER
DIFFERENCES IN PAID WORK, HOUSEWORK AND LEISURE 65-66, 73, 79 (1992); David
H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic Labor: How
Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. REL. 323,323-31 (1993).
249. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 48, at 3-10.
250. Jane Waldfogel suggests that household labor accounts for a significant
percentage of the wage gap between men and women. Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of
Children on Women's Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REv. 209, 216 (1997); Jane Waldfogel,
Understanding the Family Gap in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137,
152-54 (1998).
251. FINEMAN, supra note 71, at 163 ("The very process of assuming caretaking
responsibilities creates dependency in the caretaker-she needs some social structure to
provide the means to care for others. In a traditional family, the caretaker herself, as wife
and mother, is dependent on the wage-earning husband to provide for her so she can fulfill
her tasks.").
252. As Louise Erdrich writes, "[loving an infant] is uncomfortably close to self-
erasure." LOUISE ERDRICH, THE BLUE JAY'S DANCE 4 (1995); see also Becker, supra
note 48, at 142-46 (describing the intensity with which many mothers devote themselves to
their children).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
children but not for a man. Some women never make sacrifices for a
man, and still others negotiate more mutual sacrifices with their
partners. The point is not that all women make the same sacrifices
and all women render themselves vulnerable. The point is that
enough women make these sacrifices for us to be concerned about
why they do so and whether we need to redress any harms that
follow.
In the biologist's world, women's sacrifice is normal, if not
chosen. Embracing vulnerability will often mean reproductive
success for women. Thus, the old legal model assumed women's
vulnerability in a way that squelched women's potential autonomy.
In the economist's world, women's vulnerability is chosen and
therefore legitimate, outside the scope of the law's concern. Thus, the
new legal model simply lets women continually choose conditions of
dependence. In a feminist world, the law helps eradicate women's
vulnerability for at least two reasons. First, women may put
themselves in positions of dependence mostly because path
restrictions and rationality-limiting norms take away any realistic
options they have to choose otherwise. Second, regardless of whether
women have meaningful opportunities to avoid dependence, women's
investment in others creates value for which they should be
compensated. The law must be concerned with women's vulnerability
because we have strong reasons to question whether that
vulnerability is "normal" or "chosen." But even if it is "normal" or
"chosen," the failure to compensate for the contributions women
make to others is normatively unacceptable.
If women sacrifice their own potential independence because sex
discrimination makes that independence seem like a distant dream
and everyone's imagination is limited, 53 or because rationality-
limiting norms ridicule them for defying gender stereotypes,2 4 or
because by asserting their independence they put too much else in
jeopardy, 55 then they are making choices that they would not make in
a world with different norms and laws. As discussed above, the law
can play a role in changing those norms so that women have
alternatives to self-sacrifice. To the extent that norms scorn the
253. See supra text accompanying notes 212,215-218.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79. Norms that confine people in gender
roles may be rationality-limiting for women, but not for men, just as old racial norms were
rationality-limiting or impoverishing for African Americans but not for white Americans.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 172, at 169.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
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woman who may preference her job over her family1 6 but scorn the
man who takes paternity leave or sacrifices his own career
opportunities,. 7 we encourage women's dependence. Biologists may
say that social norms now just replicate what was a matter of
evolutionary necessity, but the important point is that social norms
are malleable. At present, social constructions of gender give
different social meaning to the same acts of parental and marital
sacrifice2s For women, sacrificing their marketability is an
expression of love. For men, enhancing their marketability (and
thereby providing better for their families) is an expression of love.
Social norms give women an incentive to be vulnerable and men an
incentive not to be,29 even though women have no biological reason
to render themselves vulnerable anymore. The law's job is to
undermine those social norms if they reinforce undesired
inequality.2 60
256. As one mother wrote, "When my husband and I walk out the door in the morning
and hear a child cry, the reason I want to turn back and he does not is that society tells me
I am a bad mother if I work outside the home." Peggy Tarvin, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28,1995, at A14.
257. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1077-79
(1994) (describing employer hostility to men who take parental leave).
258. Identical acts can have different social meanings at different times or in different
places. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 961-
62 (1995). The work of parenting has taken on very different meanings since the
Industrial Revolution took the workplace out of the homeplace. Fathers used to be the
parent responsible for socializing and comforting children. See MARY FRANCES BERRY,
THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE MYTH OF
THE GOOD MOTHER 46-47, 50 (1993). When household production decreased in
importance, the cult of domesticity assigned to women the roles of emotionally comforting
and socializing children. SARAH EISENSTEIN, GIVE Us BREAD BUT GIVE Us ROSES:
WORKING WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890 TO THE FIRST
WORLD WAR 55-61 (1983).
259. Thus, though both men and women contribute to marriage and child rearing,
women tend to incur huge opportunity costs; men, who continue to attend to their careers
as a way of attending to their children's or spouses' needs, do not. PAULA ENGLAND &
GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER: A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND DEMOGRAPHIC VIEV 55 (1986) ("Men typically make fewer relationship-specific
investments than women, accumulating instead the resources which are as useful outside
as within marriage."). This suggests that Dawkins was wrong when he allocated the costs
for parental investment in his game theory analysis by dividing the necessary investment in
child rearing equally between men and women. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
260. In order to determine whether that inequality is undesired, we must listen to what
women say and feel, not just look at what they do. Often, women say and feel that they
are frustrated by the division of labor within the household, even as they continue to
shoulder a disproportionate share of it. See WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 1 (implying that
women would rather be able to both work outside the home and take care of children);
Bird, supra note 151, at 42 (stating that the majority of women who do more than half the
household work are not satisfied with the division of labor).
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The second reason why the law must be concerned with why
women choose conditions of dependence is that often these
conditions of dependence are absolutely essential to the institutions
societies tend to hold dear, most significantly, parenting and
marriage. If women are disproportionately responsible for holding
these institutions together, it is only fair to compensate them for
doing so. Biologist Robert Trivers' "cruel bind" analysis2 61 suggests
that human females may have had to make familial investments once
because if they did not, their children would perish. Because men
could force women to shoulder a disproportionate share of the
burden of parenting, they did. More recent feminist analysis suggests
that those evolutionary conditions now replicate themselves through
social norms and gender. As Joan Williams writes, "[W]omen know
that if they do not sacrifice no one will, whereas men assume that if
they do not, women will. 2 62 Medical advances now ensure that a
child can survive just as easily with male parental investment as with
female, but women continually make the sacrifices that men do not.
Women may do this because, as a matter of evolutionary adaptation,
it was advantageous for them to do so, but there is no reason for their
role to now stay static. As Trivers himself acknowledges, the
disproportionate burden placed on the investing parent is "cruel."
To be sure, women serve their own ends when they invest in the
relationships that they nurture. This is why the radically subjective
economists often ignore or deem acceptable women's
disproportionate investment. If a woman's familial investment
increases her utility (regardless of what her investment is relative to a
man's), then the investment is not problematic to the economist. But
women generate significant positive communal benefits when they
invest in marriage and children. Society in general and families in
particular benefit from women's familial investments. These benefits
often get lost, however, in the economic and biological accounts that
focus on individual, not collective, well-being, and they get
subordinated, if not undermined, in analyses that rely on unitary
metrics.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
As Katharine Silbaugh has thoughtfully explained, one can think
about women's nonmonetary contributions to families in terms of
261. See supra text accompanying note 28.
262. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 97, at 831.
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either loss to the individual or gain to the family 6 3 Most of the
divorce reform work in the past thirty years has presented the
nonmonetary contribution problem as one of what women lose by
contributing to the family. Thus, the movement has been toward
trying to compensate women for the lost opportunity costs that
women incur as individuals. One of the advantages of this system is
that it looks to external markets to see what a woman would have
captured financially if she had been operating in those external
markets."6 External markets have objective values that fit nicely into
cost-benefit analyses. The problem is that we miss a great deal of the
value generated by women's contributions if we focus only on what
women give up.
Shifting the focus to the benefit the family receives and away
from the costs that women incur helps capture the value that is lost in
the individualistic analysis. It creates another problem though:
capturing that benefit in any sort of metric.2 65 Placing a monetary
figure on the benefit gained by a household member's (usually a
wife's/mother's) unique ability to address the particularized clothing,
eating, housing, and planning needs of a family is very difficult.
Other household labor is even harder to place a value on: counsel,
emotional support, elder and sick care, companionship, and, of
course, child care.266 Some of this labor can be purchased in the
market, but often what is purchased in the market simply is not the
same as what can be produced by family members. That is why
children create so much more work for a household, even when
parents have around-the-clock caretaking coverage. It is why older
people would rather move in with relatives than pay for strangers to
take care of them. The unique, nonsubstitutable nature of what a
family member offers in providing these services in many ways
constitutes our understanding of family. The value that family
members provide cannot be provided by anyone else.267 Because the
value is unique, it is impossible to quantify. Hence cost-benefit
263. Katharine C. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 65,94-95 (1998).
264. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 12, 49-58
(1989) (suggesting that spousal maintenance be determined based on a spouse's lost
opportunity costs).
265. See Silbaugh, supra note 263, at 100.
266. See id. at 102-08.
267. Occasionally, we grow close enough to nonfamily members that we think of them
as being able to provide the same services that family members provide. In those
situations in which we think of the nonfamily members as unique family, we do not come
to view the services provided by that nonfamily member as substitutable.
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analysis is impossible. When we insist on the applicability of cost-
benefit analysis, we miss much of the unique labor of familial
investment, labor that is disproportionately provided by women.
By focusing exclusively on individual motivation, not on gain to
others, traditional economic models ignore how one class of people
can be encouraged, through social norms, to systematically and
disproportionately enrich another. Justice in these situations may
well require ignoring the individualistic focus of cost-benefit analysis
and instead treating the family as a unit so that all costs and benefits
are presumptively shared. Such an approach would dispense with the
need to quantify any particular contribution or advantage and would
instead simply treat all assets and liabilities as communal. At divorce,
each member should be entitled to a pro rata share of the whole,
regardless of how the market or property law might otherwise assign
value or ownership.26
Income-sharing arrangements like this would also better reflect
the autonomy and choice problems discussed in this Article. A
woman's investment in domestic labor would not be seen as
inevitable such that the woman and only the woman receives alimony
at divorce. Each member of the unit would be viewed as equally
capable of contributing to and equally entitled to shares of the
collective wealth. Within the marriage, a couple could divide all tasks
as they saw fit. Certain reforms, like a shorter work week, 69 might
even operate as preference-changing norms to encourage couples to
be more egalitarian in their division of household labor. Regardless
of the roles that each individual played in the marriage, however,
decisions within the family unit would not be seen by the law as
individual choices made independent of social context. People,
particularly women, in family units do not perceive themselves as
having, and society does not encourage them to exercise, that kind of
individual agency. Accordingly, the legal model for distributing
property at the end of a marriage should not assume agency and
choice, nor should it treat family members as autonomous actors who
made independent decisions in the course of the marriage. Income-
sharing arrangements neither inhibit nor presume women's autonomy
and independence. They recognize the problems that
268. Several feminist scholars have suggested this kind of income-sharing arrangement.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 129-31; Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared
Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539,577-92 (1990).
269. For more on the suggestion that the official work week should be shortened to
thirty hours from forty hours, see Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 97, at 835-
36.
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interdependence can create and try to alleviate those problems
without restricting women's ability to exercise their own agency.
Women's tendency to sacrifice their autonomy in order to take
care of others may have biological origins, but it also has
extraordinarily high levels of contemporary social reinforcement. If
the law manipulated that social reinforcement so as to encourage
women to feel more autonomous and assert their own independence,
what looks now like biological inevitability (or at least strong
biological likelihood) might dissipate. A more independent female
self might emerge. One cannot simply create that autonomy by
declaring its existence, however. Giving women the right to be
independent will not foster that independence unless we are careful
to cabin pre-existing constraints. Feminists have already recognized
this in a variety of areas. Thus, Kathryn Abrams suggests that
encouraging women to realize more sexual agency may require
regulating some, but not all, forms of pornography so as to promote
sexual autonomy while trying to minimize the potential for male
coercion.270 Gillian Hadfield has suggested providing institutional
support designed to help women recognize the potential harms of
entering into certain contracts (surrogacy and antenuptial
agreements) so as to allow women to make decisions free of the
traditional norms that encourage them to sacrifice.271  I have
suggested modifications to adoption and child custody law that
preference women's autonomy notwithstanding those women's
previous decisions to sacrifice 72 All of these proposals, and no doubt
others, might steer women away from continuing to invest so heavily
in others.
Even if women's investment in others does not dissipate with
altered social norms-that is, even if what the biologist's account
suggests is inevitable, is inevitable-women are entitled to
compensation for the value that they provide. Biology may provide
economists with an answer for why women would "choose"
conditions of dependence, but it provides no answer to the normative
problem of whether women's disproportionate investment is fair.
Indeed, almost everything about the biologist's account of women's
reality discussed in Part I of this Article suggests that what is
biological is profoundly unjust. Economic attempts to remedy this
270. See Abrams, supra note 139, at 836.
271. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on The
Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337,348-50 (1995).
272. See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting
Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1587-94 (1998).
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injustice-by compensating for the previously unrecognized labor
that women perform-fail because of a unitary metric's inability to
capture the collective and unique value that women's labor generates.
Thus despite, and in part because of, the close methodological affinity
between evolutionary biology and economics, biology does not
provide the answers that the feminist critique of law and economics
begs, and economics fails to provide what biology demands, a
normative solution to the inequities that nature produces.
The biologist's model descriptively reinforces the feminist
account of patriarchy, but normatively, at least as it has been applied
to law, it suggests that our struggles for more autonomy and choice
are fruitless because we are destined to be governed by the biological
imperative. The economic model ignores what feminists know to be
true about the ways in which men restrict women's lives, but at least it
suggests that some positive normative value can be found in
autonomy and choice. Neither model provides an account of self or
value that reflects what women experience as true. At this point, the
feminist approach does not offer a model. Designing a model that
reflects the existing restrictive social context, offers a hopeful future,
and incorporates the complexities that permeate women's lives may
be possible, but such a model would almost certainly lack the
parsimony that biologists and economists prize. Feminist law
reformers must be wary of that parsimony. As the dilemma of
women's domestic work demonstrates, models that simplify the
analytical process run too grave a risk of abandoning either
descriptive accuracy or normative commitment.
CONCLUSION
The biological account of the way we are corresponds in many
ways to the feminist descriptions of male dominance. It shows the
same sexual possessiveness, sexual violence, disproportionate
reproductive labor by women, and male control of resources. Despite
this affinity with feminism, the biological account is disturbing to
many feminists, and it is disturbing to feminists for precisely the same
reasons that it is attractive to economists. The biological account
suggests rational and stable preferences (though the preferences
emanate from a gene, not a person). The biological account also
explains how male dominance can render continuing reproductive
success. To an economist, this model is attractive because it describes
why it is rational for individuals to act in seemingly irrational ways
and because the more stable our preferences, the easier they are to
model. To a feminist, the biological account is disturbing because the
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biological construct of rationality is based on notions of self and
choice that fail to reflect either subjective reality or normative desire
and because the biological story describes a status quo from which we
know we want to evolve.
Feminist writing and experience tells us that we live life as
neither completely free agents who choose or as shells that react. The
two ill-fitting models, one provided by economics and the other
provided by biology, may describe what we could be or what we once
were, but neither describes what we are. This does not mean that
feminists have no use for biology and economics. Feminists can use
biology to reinforce their descriptive claims, and they can use
economics to help make visible some of the traditionally female
contributions that have gone unrecognized. However, neither
discipline is able, by itself, to provide the kind of complete analysis
that feminist legal scholarship requires. Biology without normative
analysis tells us precious little about what the law should be.
Economics without an appreciation of the restrictive contexts in
which women live and work is very unlikely to render complete data
on which the law can feel comfortable relying. Feminism demands
more.
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